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1Preface
In July 2009 I got the chance to work as an intern at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in 
the Mission to the OSCE. It was a month after the Corfu Process had begun and the 
general atmosphere in the OSCE was one of great excitement. I had the opportunity to 
attend sessions of all forums, from the Permanent Council meetings, to the EU 
coordination meetings, and the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance 
Consultations. The Corfu Process was much discussed in all of them. In 2010 I had 
the opportunity to delve a little more into the topic when I came back as an intern in 
February and from May to June. The Corfu Process had already advanced, and been 
officially initiated at the Ministerial Council in Athens in December. Discussions 
were very animated and I was able to see negotiations on possible future security 
arrangements live and first hand. I decided then that I wanted to write my diploma 
thesis on this new exciting process, which might change the existing European 
security architecture. 
I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Gärtner and my colleagues for valuable 
input. Also, I particularly want to thank my parents who supported me throughout the 
authoring of this thesis.
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71. Introduction
In this thesis, I will outline the Corfu Process in the OSCE and offer a political 
analysis of it, taking into account the theoretical framework the OSCE has committed 
itself to – the comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible approach towards security. I 
will describe how the understanding of this theory has developed over the last 
decades. Furthermore, I will consider the Russian proposal for a new European 
Security Treaty, which triggered the Corfu Process, and explore how these two 
attempts to reshape pan-European security correlate.
Europe has seen many changes in its political and social frontiers in the last century. 
Until only twenty years ago Europe was divided between the Warsaw Pact and the 
Western, mostly NATO states. Today the Warsaw pact has vanished and the number 
of independent sovereign states has increased markedly. Many of them are members 
of the European Union and/or NATO and practically all of them are Participating 
States of the OSCE. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is an 
organisation founded to provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation between East 
and West – from Vladivostok to Vancouver.
To begin with, the geographical area of what is considered Europe has to be defined. 
Does Europe only consist of the 27 EU Member States? Does it embrace the entire 
territory from the west of Iceland to the Ural? Or does it reach from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok? Opinions vary on this point, but in this paper I will go with last, the 
OSCE approach. 
The OSCE does not only include the European countries, but also Canada, the US and 
central Asian countries. Hence, it is a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian organisation, including 
4 out of 5 permanent UN Security Council members.    
It is the only Security Organisation in Europe “which has officially proclaimed itself a 
regional agreement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.1 Also, it is the only 
security organisation based on a theoretical framework whereas in all other cases 
theoretical frameworks are inductively derived from the political reality. The OSCE 
has committed itself to a comprehensive approach towards security, including 
                                                  
1 Ghebali, 2009, p.55.
8military, economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects of security. The 
comprehensive approach in based on the conviction that only by including all these 
different aspects, greater and more permanent security can be provided. The OSCE 
seeks to create an inclusive, comprehensive security environment in its region by 
addressing issues through its three dimensions. 
However, since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the two power blocks, 
the role and importance of the OSCE as an organisation has changed. European 
security is no longer about making concessions and avoiding military escalation but 
about jointly combating threats from in- and outside. Unresolved problems prevail 
and prolonged conflicts inside the OSCE area have still not ceased to exist. Also, new 
ones can break out, like the crisis in Georgia in summer 2008 has shown. In order to 
face the new threats that have appeared and to act in the new constellation of the 
world, a renovation of the security architecture was needed. The Russian Federation 
had realised that in 2008 and put forward a proposal to hold a pan-European summit 
discussing a legally binding security treaty for Europe. After the crisis in Georgia in 
summer 2008, the relationship between Russia and most of the western OSCE 
Participating States had become rather hostile and the idea to agree on a security 
treaty with a legal personality was close to impossible. Anyhow, it was clear that a 
change in the current arrangements had to be made. The OSCE was considered the 
most appropriate forum for such talks and for this reason the Greek Chairmanship of 
2009 initiated the Corfu Process, a dialogue with the aim of reforming European and 
Eurasian security through the framework of the OSCE. The Corfu Process was 
divided into separate topics to make discussions easier and it was intended to be 
concluded at the OSCE Summit in Astana in December 2010.       
1.1. Research Outline
In my thesis I will start by investigating the relationship between the Russian proposal 
for a European Security Treaty (EST) and the Corfu Process in the OSCE. While 
looking at the EST, I will also look at the discontentment of the Russian Federation 
with the western countries and NATO member states. Following this, I will explore 
9the concepts of co-operative security and comprehensive security which are 
fundamental to the structure and guiding principles of the OSCE. With this theoretical 
background in mind I will outline the Corfu Process, addressing the single topics 
separately. I will have a look at the ideas that were put forward during the 
negotiations and the process, investigate how the particular topics relate to the 
framework for analysis, and compare it to the draft European Security Treaty. 
Subsequently, I am going to analyse to what extend extent the Corfu Process is 
continuing and in how far this process already has or still can change the security 
order in Europe.
1.2. Methodology
My main objects of analysis will be OSCE documents related to the Corfu Process. 
This includes Ministerial Declarations and mostly official, but partly also informal 
statements at OSCE meetings. I will also look at speeches by relevant politicians, and 
documents and treaties regarding European security by other organisations. Of course 
secondary sources, relevant academic articles and expert papers, will help me to
support my arguments and to formulate my thesis. The theoretical framework I am 
resorting to is the comprehensive framework for analysis formulated in 1998 by Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde in “Security: A new Framework for Analysis” 
and of course the comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible approach the OSCE 
itself has developed over the last decades. Structuring the analysis into different 
sectors, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde split their framework into the Military, the 
Environmental, the Economic, the Societal and the Political Sector. As the OSCE is 
divided into 3 dimensions – the political-military, economic-environmental and the 
humanitarian dimension – this framework is applies very well.
10
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2. Background
2.1. The History of the OSCE
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was not founded as 
an International Organisation in terms of International Law. The Organisation today 
arose from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This 
conference took place between 1973 and 1975 in Helsinki and Geneva; its main 
objective was to regulate security political principles, introduce confidence building 
measures and codes of conduct for the political military area, as well as the agreement 
to be dealing with a wide scope of economic and humanitarian issues.2 35 countries 
participated “ [ ]
”3. 
In 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was signed at the first summit of Heads of Government 
of the Participating States in Helsinki and set goals for common security and co-
operation in the Euro-Atlantic area. It had a great impact on Security Still, the 
” cannot be compared 
with the official foundation charters other organisations have, comprising rules, 
membership and purpose, or a treaty, as no legally binding commitments were made. 
It was a set of agreements – binding on a political level – set out in three baskets. The 
first dealt with questions on security in Europe, like principles for the inter-state 
treatment, confidence building measures and the effort to promote disarmament. The 
second basket dealt with “Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and 
Technology and of the Environment” and the third with cooperation in humanitarian 
matters in the Mediterranean. 
Especially the principles outlined in the first basket are still timely and relevant, as 
they are guidelines for the mutual relations between the participating states. 
Ten principles were listed in the “
                                                  
2 Cf. Hauser, Gunther, p. 49.
3 OSCE Handbook, p.2.
outside military alliances, …  as sovereign and independent States and 
in conditions of full equality
“Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
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”, which became known as the Helsinki Decalogue: 
   1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
   2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
   3. Inviolability of frontiers
   4. Territorial integrity of States
   5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
   6. Non-intervention in internal affair
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of      
thought, conscience, religion or belief
   8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
   9. Co-operation among States
  10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law 4
Today, the OSCE is still similarly structured with its three dimensions; it’s guiding 
principles and continues dealing with these topics. Important is, that the Helsinki 
Final Act was nor is in some way legally binding, meaning that the Participating 
States agreed on these principles but not on some kind of consequences in case these 
principles would be violated. Also later CSCE/OSCE documents did not carry a legal 
character. Considering the purpose the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe was introduced one can say that most probably the agreement on a legally 
binding treaty would not have been possible at the time.
The CSCE was supposed to be a multilateral forum for exchange between East and 
West during the time of the Cold War. The two sides were able to come together and 
negotiate within the only forum besides the UN that included States that wouldn’t be 
members of either the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the Warsaw Pact. 
Meetings continued during the years following the Helsinki conference in Belgrade, 
Madrid and Vienna to discuss, update and review the commitments made in 1975. In 
1986 at the third follow-up meeting in Vienna the decision to further the confidence-
and security-building measures was made and the discussions and negotiations finally 
led to the introduction of the CFE – the 
                                                  
4 Cf. Conference on Security and Cooperation Final Act, Helsinki 1975, p.4fff.
between Participating States
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
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 in 1990. Although important agreements on human rights topics were made 
during the foregoing meetings, the introduction of a supervisory mechanism for the 
exchange of information pertaining to human rights, called the , 
was the most substantial one. For the first time the term “ ” was 
used, as well as further conferences on humanitarian matters were decided. They were 
held in the following years and introduced crucial agreements, like free elections, 
freedom of the media and children’s rights to only name some of them.5  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the End of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact in 1990, France invited the Participating States to a summit. The 
new situation in Europe had to be discussed, now that the political bipolarity of the 
last 40 years had ended.  In the “ ” basic rules for 
international relations were codified and the CSCE was introduced as guarantor of 
security in the new arranged Europe. The guiding principles were Democracy, Human 
Rights, market economy and co-operation on the field of economy and security. Also 
a need for more institutionalisation arose. It was decided that the Heads of State 
would meet more frequently and the CSCE council was established. Here the 
Participating States agreed that their foreign ministers would meet at least once a year. 
These meetings were to be prepared by senior officials, who would carry out its 
decisions, consider current issues and think of future work the CSCE could get 
involved with. Small support bodies for the committee, which already had each CSCE 
staff of three to four officers – a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Centre in 
Vienna and an office for free Elections in Warsaw were created.6
After the Paris summit high-level parliamentarians from the Participating States 
founded the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE in 1991 and set up their Secretariat 
in Copenhagen. Also dozens of newly founded and former Soviet Union and Ex-
Yugoslavian States joined the CSCE in the years from 1991 to 1993. 
The eruption of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgian South Ossetia 
and the breaking away from Moldova by Transnistria were a reason for speeding up 
the institutionalisation process. Quickly institutions, mechanisms and instruments for 
responding to the wars and preventing further crises were developed. A court for 
                                                  
5 Cf. OSCE Handbook, p.5.
6 Ibid., p.6.
Europe
Vienna mechanism
Human dimension
Charter of Paris for a new Europe
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Conciliation and Arbitration was established in Geneva, the Free Elections Office in 
Warsaw was transformed and renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights – ODIHR, an annual Economic Forum was established and the Conflict and 
Prevention Centre was given the new authority to initiate fact-finding and monitoring 
missions in connection with unusual military activities.7 During this period also the 
call for a conference of the foreign ministers to negotiate the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh led to the establishment of the Co-Chairs and the Minsk Group, who 
continue to operate to this day, trying to find a negotiating basis for both sides. Also, 
the participation in the OSCE of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended 
in 1992 and only gained re-entry in form of several new states over the next couple of 
years, after the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.
In 1992 a follow - up summit was held in Helsinki were the CSCE officially became a 
regional arrangement according to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.8 The 
permanent committee was established and the Forum for Security Co-operation was 
introduced. Both convene on a weekly basis in Vienna. Also the position of High 
Commissioner on National Minorities was created and the same year the post of 
Secretary General was introduced. It was decided to move the Secretariat from Prague 
to Vienna in 1993 and at the Budapest Summit in 1994 the U.S. proposal to rename 
the CSCE “ ” in Europe was adopted. 
“
”9
In 1996 at the Summit in Lisbon the Participating States convened for the first time as 
OSCE. 
                                                  
7 Ibid., p.7.
8 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml, 14.09.2010.
9 Budapest Summit Declaration, Art.3.
Organisation for Security and Cooperation
The CSCE is the security structure embracing States from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
We are determined to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, thus enabling it to 
play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. To reflect 
this determination, the CSCE will henceforth be known as the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
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The Permanent Committee had become the Permanent Council, the CSCE Council the 
Ministerial Council and the Committee of Senior Officials had been renamed Senior 
Council. Several institutions, field missions and operations were set up during the 
1990ies. The last important step was made in 1999 at the Istanbul Summit.      
The need for a new security model was in the air since the renaming of the OSCE. In 
Lisbon first steps had been made towards a Declaration and finally in Istanbul the 
“ ” was adopted. The Platform for Co-operative 
Security was implemented, which is a model for co-operation with other international 
and regional organisations and should prevent different organisations from working 
side by side instead of together on similar projects and encourages them to join forces. 
Furthermore it was agreed to develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping and a Rapid 
Expert Assistance and Co-operation Team (REACT) was created which should allow 
the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for further staff or assistance in field 
operations.10 Also, the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted the “
”. This document is an important asset to the politico-military 
dimension of the OSCE, regulating confidence- and security building measures 
adapted in accordance with regional needs. 
Also an essential non-OSCE document for European Security was transformed and 
adapted at the Istanbul summit: the “
” as well as its accompanying 
”. This treaty has not been ratified 
and the Russian Federation has suspended its participation in 2007. 11   
The twenty-first century brought a number of assets to the OSCE that had not been 
there in the 1990ies. The Secretariat in Vienna with a well-equipped Conflict 
Prevention Centre, the Vienna based office of the Representative on Freedom of the 
Media, which had been established in 1997, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities and the ODIHR worked active- and effectively. The Parliamentary 
Assembly met on a regular basis and cooperated with ODIHR on election observation 
                                                  
10 Cf. Charter for European Security, p.1.
11 see Chapter 5.3. for details.
Charter for European Security
Vienna 
Document 1999
Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe “Final Act of the 
Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty
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and many field operations were set up between South-Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia.12
Priorities were shifted from short-term missions to long-term projects after the
recovery of several states from the wars in the decade before. These countries had to 
be re-socialised now that the armed conflicts were mostly settled. Democratisation 
and Rule of Law became important topics, and training of police, judges, civil 
servants and civil societies were initiated. Border security was made an important 
topic through the “ ”. The “
gave the second 
Dimension new importance. A focus was set on fighting discrimination and 
intolerance against minorities and an Academy for post-gradual international studies 
was founded in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2004. 
Also in the Forum for Security Co-operation changes had been made - the “
” and the “
” were negotiated and the “ ” entered into force. The 
latter is not an OSCE document, however it is closely linked to it. It initiated a regime 
of unarmed observation flights over the territories of States Parties and contains 
specific regulations and detailed specifications on, for example, the entry and the 
amount of the flights.13
Today the OSCE faces new challenges. Trafficking in human beings has become an 
important issue as well as drug trafficking within the OSCE Region. Corruption 
remains an issue throughout the whole of Europe. Terrorism is also a new 
phenomenon that has to be dealt with increasingly in the 21st century. Thus combating 
and preventing those issues is a new priority for the OSCE. 
2.2. Structures and Institutions
Founded as a Conference the 56 OSCE countries call themselves Participating States 
instead of Member States like in other international organisations.  
                                                  
12 Cf. OSCE Handbook, p.10.
13 OSCE Handbook, p.99.
OSCE Border Security and Management Concept OSCE 
Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension” 
Document 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons Document on Stockpiles of Conventional 
Ammunition Treaty on Open Skies
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The OSCE decision-making body is structured into various sections. The highest is 
the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government – the Summit. They are attended by 
the delegations of the Participating States and are open to the Mediterranean and 
Asian Partners of Co-operation and other international and non-governmental 
organisations. 
The Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body between 
summits.14 The Foreign ministers of the Participating States meet on an annual basis 
to review the activities of the OSCE, except in years when Summits take place. 
The regular body for political consultation and decision-making is the Permanent 
Council (PC), meeting weekly in Vienna. Permanent Representatives of the 
Participating States negotiate and make decisions on current activities of the OSCE, 
like field operations, employment of high-level positions and financial and budgetary 
matters. Its sessions are prepared through the Preparatory Committee, which meets on 
a weekly basis. Furthermore, the PC dispose over the Advisory Committee on 
Management and Finance (ACMF), which deals with the internal regulations of the 
OSCE such as staff and wages and the Security Committee, meeting on a regular –
monthly basis, discussing the current issues. Finally, the Economic and 
Environmental Committee also reports to the PC on activities and issues in this sector.  
The above-mentioned Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) also convenes weekly 
in Vienna. Its main objective is to discuss and negotiate agreements on topics 
concerning the OSCE Participating States’ security. These include confidence and 
security building measures, arms control and disarmament. 
Each year the OSCE is chaired by a different Participating State, designated two years 
in advance at a Summit or Ministerial Council. The Chairmanship is in charge of co-
ordinating and over-viewing the work-process in the OSCE as well as setting the 
priorities of the OSCE for the term in office. The Chairman in Office (CiO), the 
participating States’ foreign Minister, is assisted by the OSCE Troika, which consists 
of the incoming chair, the preceding CiO and the current one. The CiO is very 
powerful and the organisations political leader, representing the Organisation 
                                                  
14 OSCE Handbook, p.15.
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externally, guiding the OSCE bodies and chairing the political organs.15 The current 
Chairman-in-Office is Audronius Ažubalis, of Lithuania. 
The Vienna-based Secretariat of the OSCE is in charge of assisting the Chairmanship-
in-Office. The Secretary General, currently Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, 
who is elected for a term of three years, heads it. He oversees the implementation of 
OSCE decisions, advises the CiO on political, economic and legal issues and has an 
important co-ordination function.16 Also, he has to present an annually report on the 
OSCE activities. The Secretariat is divided into different subsections. The Action 
against Terrorism Unit, the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, the Strategic Police Matters Unit, the 
Conflict Prevention Centre and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and 
Environmental Activities. Of course also administrative sections like the Department 
of Human Resources, the Department of Management and Finance, and the Office on 
Internal Oversight are included in the Secretariat. The Department of Management 
and Finance is in charge of preparing the OSCE unified budget each year. This budget 
is composed of the contribution of the 56 Participating States according to scales, 
based on variables like economic, social and military power of each State. Each 
Country can make voluntarily additional extra-budgetary contributions.
2.3. The Decision-making process
All OSCE Participating States have an equal vote and decisions are adopted by 
consensus after a certain time if no objections were brought in. This decision-making 
process is on the one hand fair to all parties but makes it often difficult to find a 
solution and agreement on the other hand. A possibility not to block the decision-
making process but still express disagreement is to ask the secretariat to circulate the 
reservations the Participating State has after the decision has been made. 
Anyhow, two exceptions to the consensus decision exist. The first is the consensus-
minus-one decision. This can only be applied when the country excluded from the 
                                                  
15 Löberbauer, 2006, p. 23.
16 Ibid., p. 24.
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decision-making has violated the OSCE commitments. The decision to introduce this 
exception was made in February 1992 in Prague at the 2nd CSCE Council17 and 
applied in July of the same year suspending Yugoslavia from the CSCE. 
The second exception is the consensus-minus-two decision. This can be applied when 
two Participating States are having a dispute and a decision concerning their dispute 
has to be made. Both disputing parties would have to give up their votes. This 
decision-making modus had been introduced at the 3rd CSCE Council in Stockholm, 
in the framework of the “ ”18 also in 1992, 
but has never been applied until today. 
Again, it has to be underlined that the OSCE is in no way entitled or has the authority 
to enforce any rules, norms or mechanisms the Participating States decide upon. The 
only actual way to apply pressure the OSCE has is political leverage.
2.4. The OSCE’s three dimensions
The three dimensions of the OSCE developed out of the so-called “Blue Book”, 
which was a set of recommendations the informal preparatory talks for the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation had produced. The Blue Book suggested 
dividing the conference in three thematic blocks, the first relating to security issues, 
the second should deal with cooperation in the field of economics, science and 
technology and environmental issues and the third with cooperation in the 
humanitarian field. These recommendations were respected and resulted in the three 
                                                  
17 Prague Document on Further Development of Further CSCE Institutions and Structures, IV, 16.: 
„The Council decided, in order to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law through peaceful means, that appropriate action may be 
taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of 
the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments.  
Such actions would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply outside the territory 
of the State concerned.  This decision is without prejudice to existing CSCE mechanisms.” 
18 Third Meeting of the Council, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 4, Provisions for 
directed Conciliation, 4.: “The parties to the dispute may exercise any rights they otherwise have to 
participate in all discussions within the Council or CSO regarding the dispute, but they will not take 
part in the decision by the Council or the CSO directing the parties to conciliation, or in decisions 
described in paragraph 2(a).” 
Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
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Baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. Today, they are referred to as the OSCE’s three 
dimensions. 19
The Politico-Military dimension includes commitments, mechanisms and principles 
of the Participating States, which help improving conflict prevention and resolution. 
Also improvement in military security is been sought through openness, transparency 
and cooperation. The main forum is of course the Forum for Security Cooperation. 
Here a range of documents has been produced which are essential to European 
security today. The , the 
 regulating Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBMs) and the (SALW) are 
only some of the agreements that have been made. 
The Economic and Environmental Dimension observes developments in this field, 
helps creating policies and initiatives related to it. The biggest meeting in this 
dimension is the Economic and Environmental Forum, a two-day conference. First 
held in 1993 the Forum comes together at ambassadorial level once a year following 
two preparatory conferences. It is supposed to review the implementation of the 
norms and principles by the Participating States and to promote the dialogue on 
economic and environmental issues.
The Human Dimension seeks to guarantee the respect of Human Rights, fundamental 
freedoms and democracy, to enhance tolerance and non-discrimination and to keep 
the Rule of Law up. ODHIR is it’s primary institution monitoring the implementation 
by the Participating States and also helping them to develop the necessary 
mechanisms. Election observation missions are one very important example of the 
fieldwork under the umbrella of the Human Dimension. 
                                                  
19 Cf. OSCE Homepage, http://www.osce.org/item/44318, 30.03.2011.
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security
Vienna Document 1999
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
21
3. The Russian draft European Security Treaty
This chapter will give a short outline of changes in the Russian attitude towards the 
OSCE and its initiative to change the European security architecture through a 
European Security Treaty.  
Many think that since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union the 
world has developed into a western-dominated unipolar system. The NATO states and 
especially the US have become so powerful that they clearly dominate world politics. 
The Russian Federation had generally been kept out of big decisions, it even 
complains to have been “
”.20
Looking at Russia’s foreign policy since the end of the Soviet Union, we can 
distinguish three phases. The first phase sestets in with the Yeltsin-Kozyrev 
government, Russia being a weak country with a dependent foreign policy. During the 
second phase, the Yeltsin-Primakov government, Russia can still be characterised as a 
weak country but it already had an independent foreign policy, while the third phase, 
starting with President Putin, can be seen as that of a strong Russia with an 
independent foreign policy. These phases also can be discerned in Russia’s attitude 
towards the OSCE. In the first period great importance was given to the CSCE, it was 
seen as the potential centre for the co-ordination of European politics. It was also “
 [the Russian Federation] 
”.21 However, first disappointment arose as most other Participating 
States where also members of, or applicants to regional institutions taking over a 
similar role. The second phase was dominated by NATO enlargement and Russia 
trying to get compensation for it. The CFE treaty was going to be updated but apart 
from that a relapse into old patterns took place.22 Anyhow, Russia gave big 
importance to the founding principles of the OSCE throughout the 1990s, with a 
special focus on the inviolability of borders, stemming from the fear of territorial 
                                                  
20 Monaghan, 2008, p.3.
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shut out of decision-making processes in the Euro-Atlantic 
area
the 
only European security institution where it occupied a 
legitimate place
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claims like Germany’s claiming Königsberg/Kaliningrad or Finland’s claim of 
Eastern Karelia.23 The turning point, introducing the third phase, came at the OSCE 
Istanbul summit in 1999, when Russia was criticised for its policy in Chechnya. The 
chaotic situation within the country was the main subject of concern for the western 
countries while Russia was rather looking with apprehension towards the 
humanitarian and human rights issues on the OSCE’s agenda. Criticism arose that the 
OSCE was becoming a forum for the realisation of other organisations’ plans and 
ideas. Foreign Minister Lavrov gave proof of the increasing Russian disengagement 
by claiming that a wall between NATO and EU member states and the rest of the 
Participating States was being erected. While NATO was in charge of security and the 
EU of economic issues, the OSCE would only serve as a body for adoption of their 
values in the remaining countries. In this way he denied the OSCE area a common set 
of values and strength.  
Since then, Russia has felt rejected by most Participating States when offering ideas 
for innovating some OSCE operational principles, and has feared at the same time that 
the agenda of the OSCE might destabilise Russia’s neighbouring countries and, as a 
result, Russia too.24 Moreover, the Russian Federation feels that there is a general 
rejection of its proposals and initiatives, “
”.25 They regard the Kozak Memorandum of 2003 as an example, 
which suggested a solution for the resolution of the Transnistria – Moldova conflict. 
Therefore Russia’s attitude has become rather defensive.
The relationship between the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic community 
has been growing apart and the need for a reform has arisen. But the Russian 
Federation is not looking for innovation exclusively in terms of security. New 
strategic concept documents like the long-term concept for the development of the 
Russian Federation until 2020 and the new foreign policy and national security 
concepts intend to turn the country into an essential actor in the Eurasian region not 
only in security matters but also in energy and financial aspects.26
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25 Monaghan, 2008, p.2. 
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not for “objective” reasons but because 
they are Russian
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The Russian Federation has been setting some drastic signs of its discontentment 
concerning security politics, like the cancellation of the CFE treaty in 2007 or the 
crisis in Georgia in summer of 2008 to name but a few. Still, the first direct statement 
demanding a change was made in June 2008 when Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev called for a pan-European summit to negotiate a legally binding 
„ “ during his first visit to Germany. The time had come for 
the Russian Federation to demand new power and importance in world politics. 
President Medvedev claimed that the existing European security architecture would 
meet 21st century needs and called for the reconstruction and modernisation of 
Europe’s institutional framework. Especially NATO and the OSCE were subject to 
Moscow’s criticism.27 NATO enlargement was considered a significant external threat 
by the Russian Federation in its new military doctrine issued in February 2010. 
Today, already 28 out of the 56 OSCE participating states are member countries of 
NATO. Furthermore, NATO has been considering membership of the Russian 
neighbours Ukraine and Georgia, which would leave the Russian Federation 
incarcerated between NATO member states.28 President Medvedev’s call for a treaty 
came only two months after the NATO summit where these possible memberships 
were discussed. Also, this was not the first time that Russia proposed a treaty 
following NATO enlargements. In 1954 and 1955 then Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov had drafted a treaty, which had parallels to President Medvedevs European 
Security Treaty. This draft was released after it became clear that Western Germany 
was going to join NATO.29
In addition to the imminent NATO enlargement, issues like the “
”30 are a cause of concern to the Russian Federation and a reason to propose 
a reform of Euro-Atlantic security. 
Still, the Russian Federation regards the European Union as an autonomous security 
actor and sees many possibilities for cooperation even if the Russia would only play 
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European Security Treaty
US missile defence 
deployment plans, the use of force in ways unsanctioned by the UN (Kosovo 1999 and 
Iraq 2003), support for the dismemberment of some OSCE Participating States 
(Kosovo 2008) in tandem with insistence on the territorial integrity of others
(Georgia, Moldova), and the militarization of countries on Russia’s borders 
(Georgia)
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an assisting role and moreover rights and power would not be equally distributed in 
decision-making processes, something that would not be possible in the NATO-
Russia relationship.31
The joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council 
of the OSCE on 18th February 2009 gave the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian 
Federation, Alexander Grushko, the opportunity to address the meeting with a speech 
on the European Security Architecture. Although he stated that the OSCE should not 
be the only forum for developing the treaty, the OSCE should have an exclusive role 
in the area of arms control. This would “
”32. Also, he said that the Euro-Atlantic security matrix would have to be 
reloaded, and the best way would of course be through developing and concluding the 
EST together. The latter would become some kind of “Helsinki plus”, a legally 
binding set of principles for inter-state relations, which would be “
”33. The Deputy Minister also 
stated that today’s problems were due to a lack of trust, which is the foundation for a 
successful dialogue. 
This absence of trust between the Participating States has not been able to be 
diminished over the last decades. However, confidence and security building 
measures (CSBMs) were developed in the framework of the OSCE but have not been 
able to establish the network of trust needed to encounter modern threats unified as 
one cooperative organisation. The need for reformation of the OSCE and the pan-
European security structures, led to the initiation of the Corfu Process in summer 
2009.  
Andrew Monaghan, NATO Defence College Research Advisor, analysed in summer 
2009 the variety of possible aims the Russian Federation could have with its proposal, 
from a minimum to maximum scenario. In his view the minimum aim would be to 
interrupt ongoing processes like NATO enlargement or the US missile defence 
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February 2009, p.2.
33 Ibid., p.4.
represent a real way of strengthening 
security
based on complete 
respect for the interests of every State in the pan-European area and recognition of 
their equal rights when it comes to ensuring security
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project. Moreover, it could challenge the western community by splitting a unified 
position into individual, national, responses to their proposal. Then, the activation of 
the Platform for Co-operative Security and the inclusion of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) could be an aim, showing “
”. The “maximum” goal according to Monaghan 
could be a long-term prospective, giving the still basic proposals more substance and 
shaping them according to Moscow’s interest.34
At the end of November 2009 a draft version of the treaty was published on the 
official website of the Kremlin and a proposal of the treaty was distributed by the 
Russian Federation to all heads of state and government of the OSCE’s Participating 
States (PS) as well as to the heads of international organisations like NATO, the 
European Union, the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, of 
course, the OSCE. The treaty was released only four days before the NATO-Russia 
Council would convene, and two days before the OSCE Athens Ministerial Council, 
where the future of the Corfu Process was to be discussed. Several western countries 
saw this as an attempt to weaken or even sabotage the Corfu Process, which was to 
discuss precisely this topic – the future of European security.35
Key elements of Medvedev’s initiative were the opposition to NATO enlargement 
and the planned US missile defence system. Anyhow, the OSCE was considered an 
important actor in the shaping of the European Security Treaty as the Participating 
States overlap completely with the State Parties foreseen by the Russian Federation to 
the future treaty. An “added value” of the treaty would lie in making legally binding 
commitments compared to the previously agreed documents within the OSCE/CSCE 
and NATO-Russia Council (NRC).36
The treaty consists of 14 articles of which 9 deal with practical matters concerning the 
relation between countries in the politico-military area and five with formal issues 
from adoption to ratification.37 The treaty is designed for nation states, although by 
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the inability of the EU, OSCE 
and NATO to meet current challenges
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signing the treaty countries which are members of international organisations or 
alliances also agree that neither they nor the organisation/alliance/coalition of which 
they are members would take any security threatening measures against another party 
to the treaty.38 Furthermore, the treaty regulates the  exchange of information between 
the parties to the treaty and measures in case a party to the treaty gets attacked.
The Russian proposal focuses mostly on the politico-military dimension, giving 
special prominence to the principle of indivisibility of security and leaving behind 
humanitarian and economic issues. It specifically controls the relationship of the 
parties to the treaty towards each other in terms of hard security issues. The treaty 
practically incorporates indivisibility of security not only through the promise not to 
undertake any actions that would endanger another party’s security but also especially
by regarding an attack against one of the parties to the treaty as an attack against all 
parties.39 The indivisibility of security is of such high importance to Russian because 
of recent developments, in the course of which an armed conflict erupted between two 
OSCE PS. The OSCE PS are bound by commitments not to use force against each 
other, but as these commitments are not legally binding, the OSCE lacks explicit 
rules. Moreover, while there is an organisation dealing exclusively with “soft” 
security issues, namely the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation misses an 
organisation concerned solely with “hard” issues.40
The EST is designed for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zone, from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok, to create a legal space of politico-military security. It can be compared 
to a non-aggression pact, containing provisions for what to do in case the pact gets 
violated or aggression happens from outside this framework. The great difference 
between the EST and earlier treaties and agreements is the fact that it would be a 
legally binding treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in his speech 
during the 46th Munich Security Conference in February 2010 that the principle of 
indivisibility had been promoted to such a high extent in the 1990s that it should not 
be a problem to make it legally binding. As he claims, it is the only practical principle 
left in the draft treaty, while all other practical issues have been included in the Corfu 
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39 Cf. Ibid., Art.7.
40 Cf. Lavrov, The Euro-Atlantic Region, 2010.
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Process. However, the EST was also included and discussed during in the Corfu 
Process sessions. 
The first official discussion of the European Security Treaty within the OSCE took 
place on 27th January 2010 in the framework of the Forum for Security Co-operation 
(FSC). As the Russian Federation is concerned to keep the EST focused on the 
politico-military dimension, claiming that the biggest problems can be found in this 
area, the FSC was considered the most appropriate body. The U.S., Belgium, France 
and Great Britain agreed with the Russian Federation that changes in European 
security had to be made, still Great Britain indicated the necessity for a cross-
dimensional approach while the others made a clear link to the Corfu Process and 
assured their willingness to discuss European Security within this context and 
especially alluding to the OSCE as the appropriate framework for discussions on that 
topic.
An early reaction from the U.S. was Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 
speech at the Ecole Militaire in Paris on 29th January 2010. She confirmed the 
commitment of the United States to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and 
pointed out the importance it has for U.S. foreign and security policy. The core 
principles for the American security policy are, according to the Secretary of State, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity for all states, indivisibility of security, 
commitment to Art.5 of the NATO treaty which states that “
”, and transparency in “ ”. Russia is pointed out to 
be a partner instead of an adversary, still Clinton criticised Russia’s attitude regarding 
Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Russian Federation highlighted that the EST was not intended to weaken 
“western” organisations or to build a new European security architecture, but to give a 
legal framework to the indivisibility of security, a principle that had been 
acknowledged by all OSCE PS. Through the adoption of the treaty, the existing flaws 
in the OSCE area could be extinct in a quick way. Specific politico-military issues 
were excluded from the treaty and it would only focus on the principle of 
indivisibility, which would support the creation of a “
an attack on one is an 
attack on all the dealings in Europe
legal military-political space in 
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“.41 Furthermore, the Russian 
Foreign Minister highlighted that while the OSCE still constituted an appropriate 
platform for discussing the draft treaty, the EST should be treated separately from the 
Corfu Process as it was an independent project. 
Through introducing the draft European Security Treaty the Russian Federation has 
unwillingly initiated a dialogue on the current European security architecture in the 
OSCE. The western PS of the OSCE are not ready to commit to a legally binding 
treaty, but agree on the need to review and possibly change the OSCE’s approach 
towards security in order to improve European and Eurasian security. 
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4. The Corfu Process
4.1. Launching of the Corfu Process
The European Security Treaty has been proposed as Russia sees deficits in the current 
Euro-Atlantic security. Twenty years after the end of the cold war Europe has gone 
through major changes and most parts of Europe do not have to deal with significant 
threats to their security anymore. Still, further improvements have to be made – today 
Europe is facing very different threats and challenges than twenty years ago. The 
economic crisis, the run for natural resources like gas and oil and new threats to 
security like terrorism, cyber crime and transnational threats as trafficking in human 
beings, arms trade as well as drugs-trafficking are only some of the numerous 
challenges Europe has to deal with. 
Also territorial disputes are still posing an inner threat to European Security. Although 
the iron curtain fell in 1989, the final setting of frontiers between the post-UDSSR 
countries has not been reached today. Conflicts between successor states still remain a 
current issue, looking at Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova and Georgia.  
The latter unfortunately brought a real life example of the problems in European 
Security in august of 2008. The Conflict in Georgia showed that still dangers to 
Security within the OSCE region exist and the concept of cooperative security is not 
fully implemented. Participating States of the OSCE resorted to the principle of use of 
force against each other. Thus, after the events in Georgia in summer of 2008 it 
became clear that the OSCE’s aim, to achieve indivisible security within the OSCE 
area had still not been realised. 
With President Medvedev’s call for a new security dialogue in Europe and a legally 
binding treaty in June 2008, a first sign of discontentment with the current European 
security policies had been set.42 First official reactions to the Russian initiative within 
the OSCE came from France, holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. 
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on 17 
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July 2008, communicating that discussions should be hold in the OSCE but should 
also be linked to debates on Security issues happening in the European Union.43
3 months later, French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev on 8th October 2008 in Evian at the World Policy Conference. In his 
speech there President Sarkozy underlined the importance of reconciliation with 
Russia for Europe. Their partnership would be essential to world politics, for stability 
and prosperity. As Russia had been gaining power and strength in terms of security 
and economy the European Union would need a good neighbour, “
”.44 Still, he criticised the Russian Actions in Georgia and 
highlighted that the events of August 2008 had been a step back in Euro-Russian 
relations. As a response to the Russian initiative for a European Security Treaty he 
agreed on the need for further development, thus readiness to discuss the topic. 
Although NATO and the NATO-Russia Council would be appropriate frameworks for 
such discussions certain coherence would be missing. President Sarkozy proposed to 
hold an OSCE summit in the End of 2009, as this forum was the only one that would 
include all actors concerned with pan European security on an equal level. In this 
framework, a discussion of the Russian initiative and ideas of the European Union 
could lead to new concepts of defence. Talking of security from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok would of course also include the American partners. Sarkozy lined out 
that for a functioning dialogue the willingness to promote fundamental factors like 
democracy and human rights and the willingness to compromise and being honest to 
each other would be essential.45
Still, the relationship between the European countries as well as the US with Russia 
continued to cool down. Only some moths after the war in Georgia, the Russia-
NATO Council was discontinued and the OSCE became the only forum for 
communicating on European Security with Russia.46
The need for innovation in European Security remained of importance, and became 
for the first time since the Russian call for change an important topic in the OSCE at 
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et un bon voisin, 
c’est un voisin heureux
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the Ministerial Council in Helsinki in December 2008. The Chairman in Office at the 
time, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb expressed again that the OSCE 
would be the most appropriate forum for discussions on security and found overall 
agreement on this point. The Finnish Chairmanship initiated a working lunch for the 
OSCE foreign ministers on the future of European Security, from which the Foreign 
Minister drew several conclusions. He noted that there was a broad agreement on the 
need for discussions on European Security, new ideas had to be taken into account, 
the discussion were rather to be focused “on substance than on form” and the basic 
principles of the OSCE should persist. A wide approach had to be sought, including 
both hard and soft security, and also “so-called frozen conflicts” should be 
addressed.47 All in all it was agreed among all participants that the starting point for 
discussions should be the founding OSCE principles. A decision was released which 
called on the FSC to continue and to intensify the Dialogue on Security and to include 
other “ ”.48
Discussions on the European Security Architecture continued during Spring 2009 at a 
retreat of the permanent representatives, unofficial expert-level seminars and the 
OSCE Annual Security Review Conference where Minister Lavrov presented 
President Medvedevs proposal. 
It was agreed upon that challenges in all three OSCE dimensions remained to be 
solved. Apart from “ [there remained a need]
”49 Also, it was decided to base the future dialogue upon existing 
OSCE documents and agreements, as they should be enhanced instead of superseded. 
An informal ministerial meeting initiated by the Greek Chairmanship at the Island of 
Corfu from 27th to 28th June 2009 launched the “Corfu Process”, which should 
reconfirm “
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international forums if appropriate
the need to settle protracted conflicts,  to 
revitalize arms control and CSBM regimes, to deepen co-operation in addressing 
threats arising from outside the OSCE area and new threats (such as cybercrime), to 
address economic and environmental challenges (including energy and water), to 
ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to counter intolerance 
and discrimination.
the vision of a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area, from 
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.”50
The foreign ministers of the OSCE Participating States and representatives of the 
CSTO, EU, NATO and CIS discussed three questions the Greek Chairmanship had 
posed in a background paper previously to the meeting. They centered on first, how 
the OSCE participating States had “
” 51
The discussions were influenced by various facts, as the worsening of the economic 
situation due to the crisis and the absence of accordance in Georgia. In Chairwoman 
Dora Bakoyannis’ concluding statement to the press, it was highlighted that Europe is 
still not a united continent and that it was time to “
”52. This way and reconfirming the OSCE 
commitments the challenges Europe is facing would be dealt with.  Again, the OSCE 
was named the most appropriate body for discussions uniting the countries from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok but other institutions were welcomed to contribute –
specifically in the framework of the platform for cooperative security. Still, it was 
clear that restoring of trust between the different parties in the discussions within the 
OSCE was essential. The goal of the Corfu Process was set to “
” on the one hand and “
” 53 on the other hand, addressing 
these issues in all three OSCE dimensions. With the recommendation to look for more 
structure and priority topics in the following months as preparation for the Ministerial 
Council in Athens in December the Corfu Process was launched on 28th June 2009. 
In autumn of 2009 several informal meetings of the Corfu Process at ambassadorial 
level took place. The topics discussed sourced from all three dimensions, e.g. energy 
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Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of 
security
failed to live up to the principles of 
comprehensive and indivisible security and how can they do more to abide them?
Second, how can states strengthen the implementation of commitments across all 
three OSCE dimensions of security? Finally, what are the challenges that the 
participating States need to address?
Reconfirm our acquis, Review the 
state of play of European Security and Renovate our mechanisms to deal with 
traditional and new challenges
build a whole and 
lasting security in Europe for all ensuring the security of 
Europe against common threats and challenges
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security, conflict resolution, crisis management, human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and general principles and commitments. The informality of the meetings allowed the 
delegates to exchange in an open and forthcoming way and prepare the topics that 
would be taken forward in Athens. Still, a lack of confidence could be noticed 
between the Participating States.54  
At the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE in Athens in 
December 2009 finally an official “
” was released.55 The OSCE Foreign Ministers reconfirmed their commitment 
to the OSCE principles, as well as they acknowledged the need for new security 
measures as new challenges were being faced, including the financial instabilities. 
The Corfu Process already had started to enhance a political dialogue on security 
within the OSCE and this document invited organizations and institutions dealing 
with security related issues to participate and contribute to the process. Also, three 
guidelines were formulated to regulate the discussions: 
“
”56   
Within these cornerstones for discussions the Corfu process was officially set to 
continue in Vienna throughout the year 2010.  
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55 Relevant extracts of the Athens Ministerial Declaration can be found in the annex. 
56 MC.DOC/1/09, par.5.
Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu 
Process
(a) Adherence to the concept of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible 
security, as enshrined in the OSCE fundamental documents;
  (b) Compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE 
dimensions, in full and in good faith, and in a consistent manner by all;
 (c) Determination to strengthen partnership and co-operation in the OSCE area, as 
well as to enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE and its contribution to security in 
our common space.
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4.2. Development of the Corfu Process
To make the discussions easier, the Kazakh Chairmanship split the Corfu Process into 
8 “ticks” that were discussed at a two-day Ambassadors retreat in the Austrian 
countryside in February 2010. 2 further ticks were added at a later moment. The 
Chairmanship had formulated “Questions to be addressed” for the retreat that 
included topics that had come up in the forgoing discussions. This way, the debates 
could center on the specific topic and be kept in a certain framework. 
The single ticks were:
1. The Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 
Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
2. Transnational and Multidimensional Threats and Challenges
3. General Questions of Euro-Atlantic security
4. The Cross-Dimensional Approach to Security
5. Role of the Arms Control and Confidence- and Security Building Regimes in 
Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment
6. Economic and Environmental Challenges
7. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as Democracy and the Rule 
of Law
8. Enhancing the OSCE’s Effectiveness
9. Implementations of all OSCE Norms, Principles and Commitments
10. Interaction with other Organizations and Institutions on the basis of the 1999 
Platform for Co-operative Security
As one can see, half of the ticks are located within the first, politico-military 
dimension, while only one tick was designated to the second – economic and 
environmental – and one to the third – humanitarian – dimension. The last three ticks 
relate to formal and effectiveness issues of the OSCE. Also, Ambassadors from 
different Participating States were assigned the coordination of single ticks. They 
were in charge of informing, chairing and organizing the discussions on their specific 
topic. The Ambassadors were members of the OSCE and FSC troika, or Chairs of the 
three PC committees. Each Participating State could contribute alone or in a group by 
submitting Food-for-Thought papers (FfT-papers). They suggested a possible way of 
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addressing or handling an issue. Participating States could express their official 
alienation with the FfT-paper and be subsequently mentioned in the Paper, along the 
other Participating State(s). However, they could also just express their support for the 
FfT-paper, without aliening themselves. This way, the possible internal 
inconsistencies a State could have with the content of the Paper (due to a pending 
conflict or internal policy) or another Participating State aliened with the Paper would 
not be given. The more support and of course alienations these FfT-papers got, the 
higher was the possibility that the idea would be included in the Process.
In spring 2010 it seemed to specialists that no end would be found in the Corfu 
process, as the United States formally agreed to it, but did not show an overactive 
involvement. Although it was a good framework to hold the discussions for the 
moment, a more specific dialogue would have to be found after some time.57 Also, the 
functioning of the decision-making process in the OSCE might have presented a 
problem to find solutions and progress in the Corfu process. As decisions can only be 
adopted if no objections were brought in, the way to find an answer in the Corfu 
Process must have been very hard.
In the beginning of July 2010, the Kazakh Chairman in Office released an Interim 
Report, summing up and discussing the achievements that had already been made in 
the Corfu Process. 
Also in July 2010 finally a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan was held where the 
progress made in the Corfu process was reviewed. There also an OSCE summit at the 
end of the year in the Kazakhs Chairmanships capital Astana was decided. It would be 
the first time in 11 years that an OSCE summit would be realized. 
During the next six months the Corfu discussions continued and were narrowed down. 
They were prepared for the summit to be discussed during the time there and possibly 
lead to an action plan or solution of the security crisis happening in Europe.
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5. The OSCE’s approaches to Security
Since the end of the Cold War, new perceptions of security have arisen. No longer 
only “hard” military aspects were of importance but also “soft” issues that include 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The OSCE incorporated “soft” issues in its 
founding charter in Helsinki, too. Also among the fundamental principles of the 
OSCE are the concepts of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security. They 
are not only mentioned as part of the guidelines for the Corfu Process in the 
background paper released before the first meeting but also constitute a substantial 
part of the OSCE principles. The aim is to include all possible aspects relevant to 
security through this approach. It helps to provide a broader view of the given 
situation and can lead to more efficiency in practice if all aspects affected and 
concerned are included in the analysis and later, in policymaking.  
To start the discussion of the theoretical background of the OSCE, the term security in 
international relations itself has to be defined. Traditionally security is endangered 
when something existentially threatens an object (this can be a state, sovereignty, 
nations, religions, a species…). So security is the absence of danger.58 In the context 
of international relations security is “
”.59
When looking at security one has to look at the different forms in which it appears as 
well. The American political scientist Joseph Nye has developed the concept of “soft 
power” in comparison to hard, military power. Soft power works through attraction, 
international and/or democratic institutions and ideology, while hard power relies on 
military strength. The latter occurs when one country commands another country to 
do what it wants whereas soft power is when it gets the other country to want what 
wants.60
                                                  
58 Cf. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p.21ff.
59 Buzan et al. after Bigo, Policies en réseaux: l’expérience européenne, 1996 forthcoming, p. 31.
60 Cf. Nye, 1990, p.166f.
a structured field in which some actors are 
placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, 
by having power to define security
it
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Security has been defined and analysed on different terms and from different points of 
view in the course of time. To understand the concepts of comprehensive and 
cooperative security more easily, earlier concepts can help. 
National security or state security is one of the oldest security concepts. It is a realist 
approach and consists in the capacity of a state to survive as a sovereign state and 
having basic means to act towards the outside and the inside. It encourages an 
anarchic system and the security dilemma, which means that security of one state, is 
obtained at the expense of that of another. It is defined by the government and the 
elite and pursued through national means or alliances and the balance of power. 
Cooperation is rather rare, as other states are not considered trustworthy. 
“Collective security” emerged in the 19th century and moves away from the anarchy 
of the state security concept. States have alliances and are part of a collective system. 
Collective actions are more important than individual demands. The states in the 
collective system hold of common interests, rules and institutions, which can evolve 
into common sets of values. They have settlement systems in case of disputes but the 
collective system can still be affected or even collapse if one element does not work.
This concept developed into the one of alliances, which relies on collective defence. It 
is the contrary of collective security, as the members stand together against an 
external threat or enemy. Security is given for the alliance at the expense of others. 
The defence relies mainly on military aspects but economic and political elements are 
added. 
From collective security the concept of “common security” evolved. The Palme 
Commission61 introduced the concept in 1982 in face of the threat of nuclear weapons 
and their proliferation. This concept would join two opponents to act together on 
military issues, controlling the spread of (nuclear) weapons and limiting them. They 
should also act together on economic and environmental issues.62
                                                  
61 Olof Palme was the Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
who issued the report: . The Report was considered by a 
special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in June 1982 and included 
recommendations on disarmament, arms control and security issues.  
62 Cf. Archer, 2001, p.9ff.
Common Security: A Blueprint for survival
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5.1. Comprehensive Security
Comprehensive security makes a step away from the traditional approach towards 
security issues, which focused primarily on the military agenda. It is no longer only 
the declaration of war which is seen as a possible security issue endangering the 
sovereignty of a state. The comprehensive approach includes many aspects beyond 
the military and political dimension, such as social, societal, economic, ecologic and 
cultural aspects of security. Societal security would include a specific group of people 
(e.g. religious, ethnic, minorities) that feel the need to protect their identity against an 
aggressor or the need of securing the society itself.63
The comprehensive approach was developed academically in the middle of the 1990s 
by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School as a reaction to the new world order.64
During this time the concept of security was extended in four ways: looking at the 
security of nations, security was first extended downwards to the security of groups or 
individuals and upwards to the security of the international system, to the 
supranational level. These two extensions concern the “
”.65 The third extension is the one directly related to the comprehensive 
approach – security was expanded horizontally to different areas, including different 
sorts of security. So, “
”.66 Human security includes safety from 
existential threats such as hunger, epidemics or repression on the one hand and safety 
from disruptions in everyday life on the other.67 The forth extension happens in all 
directions as the subject of expansion is the political responsibility ensuring security. 
The nation state expands the responsibility upwards to the supranational level, 
downwards to regional and local governing institutions and horizontally to non-
governmental organisations, the media, public opinion and the market.68 Today, all 
these levels are being included when dealing with security issues. The theoretical 
framework outlined by Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver gives an appropriate background 
                                                  
63 Cf. Archer, 2001,p.14.
64 Cf. Gärtner, 2008, p.217f.
65 Rothschild, 1995, p.55.
66 Ibid., p.55.
67 Cf. Gärtner, 2008, p.100f.
68 Rothschild, 1995, p.55.
entities whose security is to be 
ensured
from military security to political, economic, social, 
environmental or “human” security
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for an understanding of the commitments made by the OSCE participating states 
during the last 3 decades and their relation to Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 
this chapter their framework will therefore be described step by step, the concept of 
cooperative security will be explained, followed by an overview of the OSCE 
documents relating to comprehensive and cooperative security. 
Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver categorise the fields of security in their framework for 
analysis in the military sector, the environmental sector, the economic sector, the 
societal sector and the political sector. They divide the analysis in object(s) of 
reference, actors and regions. Each sector has to deal with different threats to their 
sectoral security on a different level and way. While the state is an important actor 
and object of reference in almost all sectors, the areas affected by threats vary a lot 
between the individual themes. 
5.1.1. The Military Sector
The military sector is the most traditional sector of security studies. Security is most 
likely to be institutionalised in this sector. Threats to military security can come up 
internally and externally. When internal threats to security arise it is the task of the 
military sector to maintain peace, territorial integrity and protect the constituent 
institutions. Externally this sector concerns the (armed) offensive and defensive 
potential of a state, and the evaluation and perception of the power and intention 
another state might have. The referent objects of the military sector traditionally are 
states or would-be states. While in the past dynastic or national states were the sole 
objects of reference, today civic constituents and the government of a state can 
correlate on military issues. Alliances, international and regional organisations can 
become objects of military security too. Looking at governments, one has to take into 
account that in practice tensions between the ruler and the ruled can exist, which gives 
room to (non-state) units endangering military security. Military insecurity can exist 
between but also within states. The latter occurs especially when units within the state 
seek statehood. This can include tribes, rebel movements and religion, which forms 
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part of the state in some cases. Seeking statehood they become a danger to the 
sovereignty of the existing nation/state and stimulate use of force. 
Territorial integrity is a traditional object of military security, whose endangerment is 
one of the few defined objective threats. Still, one can say that military threats are 
often intentional and coordinated. “
.”69 Also, the absolute powers of 
potential attackers define the nature and extend of the menace they are posing. The 
reaction to the threat depends on the society as different societies respond in different 
ways. Today, military security still prevails in regional security dynamics but can also 
be found in local dynamics in weak states.70  
5.1.2. The Environmental Sector
Environmental security has become a more and more important issue since the mid 
1980s. It even gets awarded the title of “ultimate security” by some. The political 
structure of environmental issues has not been defined completely, although NGOs, 
governmental departments, social movements and international organisations have 
been founded to deal with them. Therefore the political power environmental issues 
have is limited. Two agendas evolved out of it, the first being the scientific one, 
formulated by science and NGOs, and the second the political one, drawn up by 
governments and intergovernmental organisations. The scientific agenda determines 
the threat, while the political one is in charge of informing the public, getting the 
approval for taking action and allotting the resources to deal with the issue. Short-
term events influence the political agenda heavily, as media, governmental and public 
standards can shape it. The political choices have to be made on an intuitive basis 
because they have to follow conclusions made in science, which the politicians cannot 
prove themselves but simple have to believe that the facts are such as the scientists 
claim them to be. This is true for all sectors but is especially relevant in the 
environmental sector. What makes this sector so complicated is the great variety of 
                                                  
69 Buzan et al., 1998, p.57f.
70 Cf. Ibid., p.49-70.
When used, they represent a breakdown or 
abandonment of normal political relations and a willingness to have political, 
economic and social issues decided by brute force
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issues dealt with. “
”71
So, the referent objects are the environment itself as well as the linkage between 
environment and civilisation. All human enterprises depend on the preservation of not 
only the local but also the planetary biosphere. 
The actors in the sector are of economic and governmental nature. The economic ones 
are mostly transnational corporations and industries. They stand in direct relationship 
to the quality of the environment and although they affect it they usually stay out of 
the political and security dialogue.  The government actors (government itself, some 
of its agencies and some international organisations) define the rules on 
environmental issues and check how well they are enforced. Also, they allow the 
institutionalisation of environmental security by international law, environmental 
ministries and intergovernmental organisations. Still, governmental actors can also 
damage the environment through nuclear testing or production and disposal of all 
kinds of weaponry, for example. Also, the actors causing environmental problems are 
in most cases not the ones affected by it. 
Environmental security has strong local dynamics, although it is an issue of global 
relevance. The amount of different issues simply makes it easier to deal with them at a 
regional and even local level. They become global issues through media coverage and 
actions to securitize are made at all levels, mainly at the global one, but it has proven 
that local moves are the most successful. This is because in most cases they show 
locally and there some action can be taken instead of waiting “
”72. Also, political insecurities at the local level 
caused by environmental problems are more likely to happen in “weak” states than in 
strong ones.73
                                                  
71 Ibid., p.75.
72 Ibid., p.92.
73 Cf. Ibid., p.71 – 93.
The ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of 
losing achieved levels of civilisation – a return to forms of societal barbarism – while 
apparently being able to prevent doing so.
for a global-level 
solution to tackle these local problems
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5.1.3. The Economic Sector
The economic sector has to deal with controversies and is highly politicised. As there 
are different theoretical approaches to economics and economic security is seen 
somewhere between “
”74 the different views have to be presented. For mercantilists and 
neomercantilists politics come first. The state plays a big role, providing security for 
markets and firms. Economic security is part of national or state security and the 
economic success is considered as zero sum.
Socialists see economics at the root of the social fabric and it is the responsibility of 
state to gear economics “ ”75. 
Economic security is aimed at the weak and opposes the strong. These two views can 
also be categorised as economic nationalisms. Both, the (neo-) mercantilists and the 
socialists grant the state a big role. The economy is, at least partly, controlled by the 
state, which also provides economic security.
The liberals by contrast think of economics first and see it, like the socialists at the 
root of the social fabric. The market should be free with as little state interferences as 
possible. Economic security protects the capitalist elite or/and consists of rules that 
were created to allow ability to move between national economies. 
Economic security is largely influenced by the liberal view – through the increasing 
interdependence of states in economies, a larger dependency on the stability and 
functioning of the respective economies arises. This leads to questions of instability 
and inequality. Also, economic security is much interconnected with other sectors and 
can depend on the survival of other sectors. Anyhow, “
”76. For 
individuals, economic security means the access to their basic human needs.
Among the many referent objects are individuals, (social) classes, the global market 
and most importantly the state itself. Firms usually do not count as referent objects, 
apart from two exceptions: firstly at a local level, when individuals up to a whole 
town are concerned and local authorities try to save the firm and secondly at a 
national level. This is when a firm has an important position in the national economy 
                                                  
74 Buzan et al., 1998, p.95.
75 Ibid.,p.96.
76 Ibid., p.116.
the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of 
the market
toward social and political goals of justice and equity
Only fears that the 
international economy will fall into crisis are clearly economic security issues
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(this can be in times of war a weapon factory for example). Still, one should be 
careful not to mix up political issues such as employment or regional development 
with economic concerns. It is for this reason that the local level rarely applies or even 
fails when it is not linked to the national one. 
The actors can be found at all levels but are mostly state representatives and IGOs. 
Anyhow, here also firms can act in the background. 
The regional dynamics of the economic sector are first of all global, as the economy is 
less and less affected by distance and we can talk of a global market today. The 
problems here are stability, more competition and surplus capacity in many economic 
sectors. These make the dynamics on a regional level still, or again, attractive – in 
case of a crisis states still take recourse to their regional economic ties, that cause 
lower costs in transportation and communication than on a global level. Also, the 
regional culture is preserved in comparison with the homogenised global market. 
Thus, “  [partly] 
”77. At a local level economic security is basically linked to the provision of 
basic human needs and the capacity of the state to survive.78
  
5.1.4. The Societal Sector
Societal security is not to be confused with social security, which is generally about 
individuals and their economic needs and does not concern the society of a state, 
which is more concretely its state population. The societal sector is closely related to 
the political security sector. Still, most of the time state and societal boundaries do not 
overlap. While a state has, at least in most cases, a defined territory, societies can 
exist across borders. They are composed of individuals sharing the same ideas and 
practices, creating a common identity. 
“
                                                  
77 Ibid.,p.114.
78 Cf. Buzan et al., p.95 – 117. 
economic regionalism is based in the desire to preserve societal 
security
The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists 
when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to 
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”79. Threats to the common identity can end in a conflict 
when one self-defined identity group prevails over another. 
The most frequent issues threatening societal security are: migration, when the 
identity of one group influences or even changes the identity of another group; 
horizontal competition, where the identity of one group is changed by influences of a 
neighbouring identity group; and vertical competition. Here groups stop being 
individual groups because a project links them to wider or narrower identities. A 
fourth threat can be depopulation, which is not distinctively part of societal security, 
apart from explicit policies determining the extinction of an identity group or cases 
“ ”80. These issues can appear alone but also 
combined on a spectrum from intentional, programmatic and political opposed to 
appearing united and structural. 
Essentially societal security issues are always about identity. Reactions to threats can 
consist either in undertakings by the identity group itself or in taking the issue to the 
political or military sector by putting the threat on the state agenda. Non-state means 
for minorities to survive are to “ , […] 
”81 or to run their own system, not using institutions of the dominant 
society. 
The referent objects in the societal sector are groups that can establish the argument 
that their “we” is threatened. In the past, these groups were usually limited to a local 
level, or even families, having close ties with the ruling political structures. Today it 
they can reach from tribes and nations to civilisations and religious groups. The media 
has become an important actor in the societal sector because parties and the reasons 
for the conflict are identified with its help. 
As every society has different weaknesses also different patterns causing conflicts can 
be found. Identities that are formed through isolation or separateness from others can 
be troubled by very little admixture from outside. States that are governed by an 
identity group that is larger only by a little difference than the other groups, or that are 
ruled by repression of the bigger group, can be irritated by immigration or a higher 
fertility rate of the non-governing group.  If the national identity is tied to the culture, 
the overrunning of the “general” culture can become a threat to their society. Nations 
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their survival as a community
where quantity turns into quality
dominate the existing government to form their 
own government
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that unite different ethnic identity groups can be endangered if one ethnic group seeks 
self-determination or independence but also if nationalism spreads among one or all 
groups.
The regional dynamics of the societal sector is generally limited over small distances. 
Still, trends towards more global dynamics can be observed. Issues related to 
migration such as diseases, or even crime that are related to poverty and are spread 
through migration concern the generally poorer southern hemisphere of the planet. 
Also the spread of a global – western – culture is a sign for a globalization of the 
societal sector. However, every region of the world has different dynamics and issues 
and must therefore deal in first place on this level with it.82
5.1.5. The Political Sector
The political sector is a very complex sector, as it includes many different aspects, 
considering that “ ”.83 All threats to security discussed in the 
sections above are also political. Still, it is a sector of its own. Political security is 
about non-military threats to the sovereignty of a state, about the organisational 
stability of states, their systems of government and the ideologies that give the 
governments their legitimacy.84 Threats can be made to the internal legitimacy of the 
political unit, e.g. its ideology and constitutive ideas – its social orders. Another factor 
affected by political threats to security is the external recognition of a state, it’s 
external legitimacy through recognition. Threats coming from outside do not have to 
be directed against the sovereignty of a state but are in many cases directed against 
the states’ ideology. The degree of vulnerability of course varies between strong and 
weak states. In weak states often nation and state do not overlap and that can lead to 
internal threats. Typically they are directed against the basic institutions and the 
ideology. Furthermore, political violence can arise. If nationalism and ideology, the 
two components that hold most units together, are endangered this can lead to the loss 
of the political order. But not only weak states have to deal with political insecurity. 
                                                  
82 Cf. Ibid., p.119 – 140.
83 Buzan et al., after Jahn, Lemaitre, and Waever, Concepts of  Security: Problems of Research on Non-
Military Aspects, 1987, p.141.
84 Cf. Buzan et al, 1998, p. 119.
all security is political
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“
”85 However, 
political security can also concern threats to political units other than states, such as 
international society, order, and law, which are the referent objects in the international 
arena. They represent directives that can be threatened through non-acceptance, 
violation or challenge.
Obviously the main object of reference of the political sector is the territorial state. 
Besides, emerging quasi-super states, self-organized and/or stateless societal groups 
and transnational movements that can mobilise their followers to a large extent, can 
be objects of reference.
The actors are mostly states and governments. International organisations are 
collective actors, which have an approved securitizing capacity (as for example the 
United Nations disposes over the UN Charta, which includes rules for when 
securitizing measures can be effected and by whom).
As for the regional dynamics of this sector, threats do not happen exclusively at a 
global nor at a local level. In most cases it comes to disputes arise between two or 
more states, so mostly at a bilateral level. Often these disputes are linked to a global 
level (through the involvement of an international organisation) but can also become 
cross regional. Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver define nine possible cases of political 
insecurity: Intentional threats to (weak) states on the basis of their state-nation split; 
intentional threats to (weak) states on political-ideological grounds; inadvertent, unit-
based threats to state-nation vulnerable states; unintentional threats to states on 
political-ideological grounds; security of and against supranational, regional 
integration; systemic, principled threats against states that are vulnerable because of a 
state-nation split; structural (systemic) threats to (weak) states on political-ideological 
grounds; threats to transnational movements that command supreme loyalty from their 
members; threats to international society, order, and law. In most of these cases, the 
smaller constellations happen at the same time on a regional level.86
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Strong states can also experience political security threats from integration projects 
that threaten their sovereignty (and their recognition and status).
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The OSCE was the first organisation that took a comprehensive theoretical approach 
to security. It has thereby influenced the situation in Europe with it since 1975. The 
comprehensive approach can be seen in the three dimensions the OSCE is divided 
into since the so-called three baskets were formulated in the Helsinki Final Act. 
Importance was given not only to political and military security issues but also to 
environmental, economic and humanitarian problems. While the first dimension of the 
OSCE deals with the “hard” security issues, the second and third dimensions relate to 
societal, “soft” and “civic” security topics that are still essential for an all-embracing, 
extensive approach to security. Civic security refers to everything concerning the 
civic aspects of soft security that are not related to military issues. While Buzan, de 
Wilde and Weaver deal with economic and environmental issues separately; the 
OSCE unites them into one, the second dimension, for the reason that they stand very 
close together, sharing many threats and challenges.  
With the End of the Cold War a need for reaction of the CSCE to the new global order 
in security, politics, economics and ideologies arose. Confidence and security 
building measures, conflict prevention and resolution, the protection of Fundamental 
Freedoms were only some of the issues that became relevant in the institutionalised 
OSCE and gave the organisation a broader perspective than the one it had had. 
The OSCE’s comprehensive approach can be seen in the commitments made by the 
Participating States starting with the Helsinki Final Act and continuing up until today 
through the Corfu Process. 
5.2. The Cooperative Approach and Indivisibility of Security
It is not only the concept of comprehensive security, which has to be considered when 
looking at the OSCE. There is a second approach, which has to be taken into account: 
cooperative security. The two concepts stand closely together. However, the 
cooperative approach emphasises in the indivisibility of security. This can be 
understood as taking the view that the classical two sides are no longer given but that 
all sides work together. States benefit from their cooperation but can also all be 
affected when one country has security issues. “Therefore, no participating State 
should enhance its security at the expense of the security of another participating 
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”87 Thus, security becomes a responsibility shared by all Participating States. 
Cooperative security also means that states act together against commonly proclaimed 
threats but have no legal support obligations. So cooperative security is not 
automatically free of violence, but it can be. It is the tie between the states that 
enhances security and prevents aggressions and wars. What is important is that the 
commitments to cooperate that are being made are not of a legal but of a political 
nature. This is also where for some of the weaknesses of this system lie, as no 
sanctions can be introduced against a cooperation partner who violates the 
agreements. Furthermore, a cooperative security system has no army or military 
instrument of power of its own, thus it is not safe against attacks from outside the 
system. Consequently, conflict and crisis prevention are important mechanisms in the 
cooperative approach and therefore in the OSCE.88
Examples of cooperative security are the participation in International Organizations 
and affiliation with arms control treaties and multi- and bilateral agreements.89 Cases 
are the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Agreement can be named. The OSCE counts 
to its cooperative approach also its cooperation and collaboration with other 
organizations and its Partners for Cooperation.     
The reason for claiming that the OSCE uses a cooperative approach to security is not 
only implicit in the agreements and decisions, which will be listed subsequently but 
also because the OSCE openly declares it itself. Many OSCE documents underline the 
cooperative, comprehensive and indivisible security approach the Participating States 
commit themselves to. Furthermore, the Participating States have to work together on 
a cooperative basis as since the beginning of the Organisation participation in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was voluntary. Also its successor 
organisation, the OSCE, works today on a cooperative and not a normative basis.
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89 Cf. Gärnter, 2008, p.127f.
State.
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5.3. The OSCE’s Approach to Comprehensive, Cooperative and Indivisible 
Security
Naturally the OSCE’s comprehensive and cooperative approach to security is much 
more practical than the theoretical framework laid down by Buzan, de Wilde and 
Waever. Still, with this framework for analysis in mind one can recognise the 
parallels between the theory and the decisions for actual intrastate treatment made by 
the Participating States in the course of time. The theoretical background provided by 
the three political scientists can be found again in the OSCE documents, which will be 
presented below. In the OSCE the comprehensive approach is translated quite literally 
into practice. All sectors overlap and correlate in the documents and the 
comprehensive approach is implemented in a cooperative way by the Participating 
States. In the following, the OSCE decisions and commitments relevant for the 
comprehensive and cooperative approach as mentioned in 
, which was released for the 2009 Annual 
Security Review Conference, are being listed. They are presented in chronological 
order, as it is easier to understand the developments made year after year in a 
historical context. This is partly because of the circumstances they were decided for 
(the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s for example) and partly because the 
comprehensive and cooperative approach simply developed naturally and new ideas 
complemented the old ones.
The first relevant commitments touching all OSCE dimensions and relating to all 
sectors in the framework for analysis were made in 1975 in the Helsinki Decalogue.90
The East and the West had come together and managed to express their will to 
cooperate through common principles. 
In 1990 the first big steps in the economic and environmental dimension were made. 
The document of the Bonn Conference includes principles and guidelines that are 
typical for a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. The principles of 
market economy were supported to enhance a greater economic cooperation between 
the Participating States and democratic institutions and economic freedom were 
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the OSCE Concept for 
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
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highlighted to be essential for economic and social progress. Like the liberal approach 
to economic security the Participating States committed themselves to the 
development of a free, competing market economy. Still, economic growth and 
development should take place in an environmentally sustainable way. 
The same year, at the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension crucial commitments for the third dimension were made. It was stated, that 
the basic purpose of government was the protection and promotion of the Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Looking at the dangers to security in the societal 
sector this decision can prevent most of the afore-named issues.
In November 1990 the  was produced. One year 
after the fall of the Berlin wall this document is full of hope and does not only start by 
introducing “ ” but also outlines the 
importance of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the promotion of 
disarmament and arms control to create more transparency between the Participating 
States and most relevantly the indivisibility of security. “
.”91 The decision to fight non-
military threats to security such as illegal activities linked to pressure from outside, 
threats to territorial integrity and dangers such as terrorism and drug trafficking 
clearly fit into the political sector of the comprehensive approach. Also the decision of 
the development of mechanisms for peaceful conflict prevention and resolution can be 
placed in that sector.  
Furthermore, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was 
signed by 22 states – a very important step towards future European security 
arrangements and a key document for military security.
As for the societal sector, it was decided to promote the improvement of the situation 
of national minorities. 
The meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow in 1991 lead to 
the creation of the “ ”, which designed the possible initiation of ad 
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Charter of Paris for a New Europe
a new era of democracy, peace and unity
Security is indivisible and 
the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others.  
We therefore pledge to co-operate in strengthening confidence and security among us 
and in promoting arms control and disarmament
Moscow Mechanism
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hoc missions of independent states or rapporteurs in case of a dispute. The mission 
should find facts and report them and give advice on possible questions as well as 
promote the dialogue and cooperation between the conflicting parties. The mission 
could be initiated without the consent of the relevant Participating States. 
Furthermore, the Moscow document proclaims the respect of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law to be part of the foundation of the 
international order. Protecting the political security, the Moscow document commits 
to supporting democratically elected governments in case of an attempt at 
overthrowing them and sees law enforcement, the executive and the judicial control 
ideally under direction and control of civil authorities. Being an important actor in the 
societal sector, the media and its freedom is included in the document as well as 
gender equality and the protection of human rights in states of emergency. 
1992 brought the which put again a focus on indivisible and 
comprehensive security. To prevent terrorism and illicit trafficking the root causes of 
these issues would have to be addressed. Also early warning, conflict prevention and 
crisis management were to be strengthened. Among the Participating States new 
security relations based on cooperative and common approaches to security were 
aimed to be established. In light of the cooperative approach, higher involvement with 
NGOs, the United Nations and non-Participating States were set as goals. The 
Mediterranean States should participate at review conferences in the future. The 
establishment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) again 
strengthened the societal security sector. An amalgamation between the military and 
political security sector was achieved by the decision to include civilian and military 
personnel in peacekeeping and building operations. Another focus on this sector was 
set through the establishment of a conflict prevention centre and the FSC. 
At the Rome Ministerial Council in 1993 again a focus on the comprehensiveness of 
the OSCE’s approach was laid, also it was aimed to strengthen the OSCE as a forum 
for cooperative security. Furthermore, “
”92 It was agreed that issues lying in the 
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Helsinki Document, 
by utilizing the CSCE agreed set of standards 
and principles, participating States can demonstrate their unity of purpose and action 
and thus help to make security indivisible.
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human dimension, as well as issues of economic transformation, development and 
cooperation were essential to the comprehensive concept. Another important factor 
for societal security in the OSCE was that it was decided to strengthen the CSCE’s 
role in combating xenophobia, racism, chauvinism, nationalism and anti-Semitism –
some of the biggest threats to societal security. In the same light, the HCNM was to 
receive more resources, and the Human Dimension should also be included in the 
mandate of (field) missions. A sector-overlapping decision was the addressing of 
issues of displacement and refugees (societal sector) in the context of conflict 
prevention and early warning (political sector). Within the military sector it was 
agreed to make cooperative arrangements ensuring that a third party in a conflict area 
would act in accordance with the CSCE principles and commitments, which were the 
following: “
”93 Cooperative 
security was applied by deciding to strengthen the cooperation with other 
organisations, on all levels, in crisis prevention and management, which again can be 
counted as part of political security. 
The  of 1994 again highlights the importance of cooperation 
between the CSCE and other organisations. It also grants the option to refer disputes 
to the UN Security Council. An essential document for the first dimension, and the 
military security sector was introduced, namely the 
. This Code of Conduct specifically regulates the role of 
armed forces in democratic societies. The protection of the biggest value of military 
and political security, sovereign equality, was stressed. Mutual security relations 
should be based on a cooperative approach. Again, cooperation should happen on all 
levels and the Participating States should act in solidarity in case of violation of norms 
and/or commitments. A duty of non-assistance to States that turned to the use of force 
or threatened the territorial integrity and thus sovereignty and political independence 
of another state was expressed. Also, states should have at their command only as 
much military capacity, as they needed for their individual or collective security. As 
an important element for the indivisibility of security the Participating States should 
                                                  
93 Decision of the Rome Council Meeting, 1993, p.8. 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; consent of the parties; 
impartiality; multinational character; clear mandate; transparency; integral link to a 
political process for conflict resolution; plan for orderly withdrawal.
Budapest Document
Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security
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implement commitments in arms control, disarmament and CSBMs. As for the other 
sectors relating to security, it was decided that in order to avoid tensions between 
states, economic and environmental cooperation should be expanded and only 
constitutionally established authorities should be in control of any sort of military and 
security forces, which of course should act conforming to international humanitarian 
law and political neutrality.94  
After the institutionalisation as the to Organisation of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, the 
 of 1996 underlined the goal of the Participating 
States to create “
” in Europe.95 The Participating States were granted a free choice of 
their security arrangements – also including treaties of alliance (this obviously was 
included for NATO member countries), but it was also laid down that no individual or 
group of State(s) nor organizations within the OSCE region should have greater 
responsibility than others for the maintaining of peace and stability in the area. 
Furthermore, cooperation and coordination between the Participating States and other 
organizations and institutions would be required in order to guarantee European 
security, and the OSCE with its comprehensive approach would be a very suitable 
forum for this purpose. In the that was adopted at the 
Lisbon Summit, too, the principle of indivisibility of security is again highlighted. By 
connecting and promoting obligations of arms control the Participating States 
expressed their willingness to act jointly in this field. The FSC was granted a major 
role in this particular issue and it was pointed out, that existing documents and 
decisions were interconnected and should be handled in this way. 
In 1999 the  was developed, which set important measures for 
security in all sectors, but especially the military and political one. It includes 
confidence and security building measures for several areas through sharing of 
military information on manpower, equipment and weaponry. In the field of defense 
planning it was agreed to report on plans, doctrines and policies as well as budget 
used for military purposes. In light of the cooperative approach, mechanisms for risk 
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Lisbon declaration on a common and comprehensive security model for 
Europe for the twenty-first century
a common security space free of dividing lines in which all States are 
equal partners
Framework for Arms Control 
Vienna Document
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reduction were agreed upon. They included consultations and cooperation on unusual 
military activities, cooperation when coming to hazardous incidents of military nature 
and voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concern about military activities. Through 
these mechanisms much transparency between the Participating States was 
introduced. Of the same nature were the agreements to invite observers to special 
military activities and to inform the other States about them in writing. From the 
comprehensive approach, regional measures were taken into consideration. The 
importance of regional particularities in matters of security was highlighted and 
Participating States were urged to adapt the CSBMs to their particular regions, and 
their needs. 
A further important document for the comprehensive and cooperative approach is the 
, which was adopted like the  at the 
Istanbul Summit of 1999. In the political and military sector, it laid down the 
importance of strengthening the OSCE in areas of conflict prevention and settlement 
and the post-conflict restoration of societies. Here a Rapid Expert Assistance and 
Cooperation Team (REACT) was created, in order to be able to react to Participating 
States asking for civil but also police assistance in conflict situations. A wider and 
more dedicated dialogue on security had to take place to enable “a common and 
indivisible security space free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of 
security.”96 Furthermore, it was decided to intensify work with the Partners for 
Cooperation. In the societal sector the rejection of any policy indicating the cleansing 
or expulsion of an ethnic group was stated. An important development in the third 
dimension was the decision to invite election observers from other Participating 
States, the ODHIR and the Parliamentary Assembly, who would also assess the 
elections and pronounce recommendations in the follow-up phase. This was an 
important step towards democratic and free elections in the whole OSCE region. The 
, a part of the Charter, was aimed at strengthening 
the cooperation with other international and regional organizations and institutions. 
The single organizations should be treated with equal importance, shared their values 
and show each other mutual support. Their common work should be improved on a 
case-by-case basis. 
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The last document mentioned in the OSCE Concept for Comprehensive and 
Cooperative Security is the 2003 OSCE strategy to address threats to Security and 
Stability in the 21st century. At the Maastricht ministerial council, the Maastricht 
Strategy was adopted, which stated that armed conflicts would be less likely to 
happen in the OSCE region, than threats to security cutting through all dimensions 
and leading to destabilization. “
”97 Threats like terrorism and organized 
crime could arise from weak governance and malfunctioning democratic institutions. 
A suggestion looking at the cooperative approach sees the need to address the source 
of the problems, which are, in addition to the before mentioned weak governance, also 
intolerance and economic imbalance. The comprehensive concept is connected to 
Human Security in this strategy. Again the cooperative view of need for more intense 
cooperation was expressed as the Participating States realized that threats to security 
were not limited to the OSCE area and no organization or state would be able to 
address them alone. 
As one can see from the documents above, especially the issues of the societal sector, 
in particular minorities in nation-states are highly relevant topics in the OSCE. Most 
of the OSCE Participating States have large minority groups, thus minority issues also 
dominate domestic politics – not only the supranational level. Addressing issues 
related to them was recognized at an early stage to possibly have a conflict and crisis 
preventive effect.  
Also important are two treaties, which are not OSCE documents per se, but were 
negotiated under the umbrella of the OSCE. Namely, the  and the 
. A big part of the OSCE PS are parties to one or both of these treaties.
Although the  (CFE) is not part of the OSCE 
and not an official OSCE document, negotiations and signing of documents happened 
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The OSCE, with its broad membership and “its 
multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible 
security” is particularly well-equipped to address the qualitatively new security 
challenges that have emerged in recent years.
CFE treaty Treaty 
on Open Skies
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
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in the past at OSCE summits. The reason for this is that all States involved in the CFE 
treaty are at the same time OSCE Participating States. However, not all CFE parties 
are OSCE Participating States. Anyhow, an organisation uniting the former blocks of 
NATO and the Warsaw treaty seemed to be the ideal place to negotiate this 
agreement.  
The CFE Treaty was signed in December 1990 at the CSCE Paris summit, ratified the 
following year and entered into force two years later, in 1992. 
This treaty became a cornerstone for European security – especially when coming to 
hard security issues. It regulated the amount of weapons and conventional military 
equipment the countries were allowed to have and set a limit in the numbers. Until 
1995 big parts of European military equipment and weaponry could be reduced.
In 1999, at the OSCE Istanbul summit an agreement on an adapted version of the CFE 
Treaty was signed - the ACFE (Adapted CFE). While the first version of the treaty 
still had the limits of the allowed forces divided into blocks, this adapted version set 
limits to the number of conventional forces the single nation-states were allowed to 
have on a national level and on a territorial level. The adapted treaty would reduce the 
amount of conventional armour in Europe by around 10% and would only come to 
effect until all 30 parties have ratified the treaty. Until this point the original CFE 
treaty stays valid. Some parties however only wanted to ratify the adopted version if 
the Russian Federation would withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. 
A throwback in the ratification process clearly was the suspension of the Treaty by the 
Russian Federation in 2007.
The  was suggested by former U.S. President Dwight 
Eisenhower back in 1955 but was only realized at a meeting between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in 1990. It was officially signed in 1992 at the OSCE summit in 
Helsinki. Only 10 years later, in 2002 the treaty went into force for an unlimited 
period of time. 34 states are currently parties to the treaty, among which one can find 
the Russian Federation and the United States. It initiated unarmed observation flights 
over the territories of the parties to the treaty. Quotas for the observation flights, 
notification of the point of entry in the territory and technical characteristics the 
sensors used for observation are regulated among others in this treaty.  A consultative 
Treaty on Open Skies
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commission meets on a regular basis in Vienna to discuss the putting into practice of 
the treaty. 
Seeing all the OSCE commitments and decisions it is hard to imagine how conflicts in 
the OSCE region, like the 2008 crisis in Georgia, could happen anyways. After all, all 
Participating States agreed to these common principles. This is why it has to be 
recalled, that the OSCE agreements are not legally binding and no consequences can 
be imposed by the OSCE in case of violation. It may be for this reason, that the 
Budapest Document conceded the option to refer to the United Nations Security 
Council in case of disputes, as the Security Council has the power to act if it comes to 
unanimous agreement. Although the OSCE possesses of several mechanisms to act 
preventively or after a conflict, the ideal situation of a conflict-free OSCE region has 
not been achieved at this time. For this reason, a call for innovation arose in the last 
years. The Corfu Process aims at tackling the issues existing in the OSCE area and 
finding solutions for equipping and improving the work of the Organisation in the 21st
century. 
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6. The Corfu Process and it’s relation to the EST
This chapter deals with the substance of the Corfu Process and its relationship to the 
Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty. For a better understanding of the 
subject matter, a little insight into the relationship between the Russian Federation and 
the OSCE concerning this topic has to be given. Two speeches, one of the 
Ambassador to the OSCE of the country initiating the Corfu Process, Greece, and the 
other from a representative of the Russian Federation, will give a short example of the 
relation between the Russian Federation and the OSCE. 
In spring 2009, before the meeting in Corfu, Amb. Mara Marinakis, then Chairwomen 
of the Permanent Council, gave a speech at an expert meeting on European Security. 
She outlined that the Security dialogue that had started in the OSCE had been initiated 
by the Russian proposal for a pan-European summit to draft a Security Treaty. Given 
the unresolved situation in Georgia and the Russian suspension of the CFE treaty, the 
general position of the “western” PS towards the Russian Federation was rather 
animus. The Ambassador outlined that the OSCE was the ideal forum for treating 
with the renewal of European Security, considering the toolbox and the 
comprehensive approach of the OSCE including the Human and Economic and 
Environmental Dimension. In her speech, side blows towards the Russian Federation 
could be clearly noticed. She did not only underline that for taking the Corfu Process 
forward trust had to be rebuilt between the OSCE Participating States, but also that all 
Participating States would have to implement the agreements made in the OSCE. 
Furthermore she made a very harsh comment on Georgia, which was still a big topic 
in the OSCE at the time. If there were to be agreement on the OSCE presence in 
Georgia, it would show commitment to the common cause, while failure could mean a 
step back from seeing the OSCE principles in action.98
In a joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Permanent Council 
in September 2009 Vladimir Vronkov, the director of the Department of Pan-
European Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, addressed the 
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question which approach should be followed concerning European Security. He stated 
that the “Greek Corfu meeting initiative” and the EST would be overlapping but were 
not replaceable approaches. The difference would be as simple as the difference 
between a document and a meeting. “
”99
Nevertheless, he also assured the meeting of the co-operation of the Russian 
Federation in the Corfu Process and the gratefulness for its’ launching. In 
continuation the Russian Federation participated actively in the discussions.
Looking at the five ticks related to the politico-military dimension of the OSCE one 
could say that there was an attempt to counterbalance the Russian proposal of a 
European Security treaty,100 or even to thwart it. Anyhow, the Kazakh Chairmanship 
announced that the EST would be included in the talks on the new European security 
architecture. Still, Kazakhstan is seen as a “ ”101 of the Russian Federation 
and “ ”102. 
However, the Russian Federation is well aware that their proposal has introduced 
changes to the European Security landscape. Russian foreign minister Lavrov said 
during his speech at the 2010 Munich Security conference, that “
” if it had not been for President Medvedevs initiative.103    
6.1. Analysis of the Corfu Process “ticks”
The 10 ticks the Corfu Process is divided into, address the main issues European 
security and the OSCE are confronted with today. Because the OSCE is a security 
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100 See Chapter 3. The European Security Treaty.
101 Zellner, 2010, p.237.
102 Richter, Schmitz, 2010, p.3.
103 Speech by H.E. Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, 46th Munich Security 
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The Treaty on European Security is a document 
drawn up with the involvement of all the international structures of the Euro-Atlantic 
region, while the “Corfu Meetings” are discussions within the framework of the 
OSCE covering a broad agenda that includes the enhancement of the Organization’s 
effectiveness and its three “baskets”.
close ally
not the “neutral” broker it claims to be
[…] there would be 
no shake-up in the OSCE
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organisation, security of its region of influence is of course the main subject the Corfu 
Process deals with. However, the ticks include not only political issues and (possible) 
threats to security but also formal, bureaucratic, internal issues of the OSCE as a 
regional and international security organisation. In continuation I will outline the 
contents of these “ticks”, analyse them one by one through the theoretical framework 
of analysis described in the foregoing chapter and set them in the context of 
comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security. Moreover, I will compare the 
single ticks of the Corfu Process to the Russian draft for a European security treaty. 
The aim of this comparison is to analyse how much they have in common, 
considering that they have been initiated for the same reason, to renew the European 
security architecture and some even claim that the Corfu Process could have been 
initiated to give an answer to the EST. Also, I will look at the possible outcome or 
future development in the OSCE of this particular topic. I will base my speculations 
on the issues discussed and negotiated before and at the Summit of Astana. The 
documents used in this section are mostly not accessible to the public, which is why 
they cannot be cited nor can the countries making statements to give their opinions, be 
named.  
6.1.1. Implementation of all OSCE Norms, Principles and Commitments
This tick is dedicated to the Principles, Commitments and Norms that the OSCE has 
developed over time and partly failed to put into practice. It transcendents all other 
ticks, in the Corfu Process it was discussed during sessions on all other ticks and no 
proposals or Fft-papers were developed specifically for this topic. This tick can be 
seen as the most important one, as all other topics can be developed as profoundly as 
possible, but if no implementation by the Participating States occurs, all work and 
discussions become redundant. As mentioned several times already, the OSCE has no 
legal force and the commitments made by the Participating States in its framework are 
of a political nature only. The lack of implementation so far and the urgent need to do 
so will recur in many other ticks. 
The absence of a legal obligation to implement principles and commitments was the 
starting point for discussions for the Participating States. The common work in the 
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OSCE happens purely on a voluntary basis, a fact that was considered as a reason for 
improving the application of the commonly decided norms, principles and 
commitments. Furthermore, the Participating States emphasised the coherence of this 
issue with the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE concept of indivisible and 
comprehensive security. All dimensions and all issues dealt with in the OSCE depend 
on the subsequently occurring implementation. 
While it was noted that the first dimension is the most developed one when coming to 
reports and notifications on the implementation, the second – economic and 
environmental – dimension was the least advanced in this field. A possible solution to 
this problem was the application of practices used in the politico-military dimension 
in other dimensions, keeping in mind the differences in conditions. The Human 
Dimension led to the biggest controversies between the Participating States, as many 
different perspectives prevailed. Possibilities for further action were identified and 
listed in an OSCE document, namely: the strengthening of the review mechanisms 
(for example through merging the dimension-specific review conferences into a single 
one), enhancing the existing decision-making bodies, the cross-dimensional role of 
review conferences, the sharpening of existing tools and the development of self-
assessment tools, where peer review is included. The mechanisms for putting 
decisions and commitments into action would have to be developed in the individual 
dimensions but Participating States could provide annual reports on their actions in 
this matter. This could show the issues of primary concern. Progression in each 
dimension could be improved by commitment to a predetermined or unfolding agenda 
laid out for several years. 
This tick particularly embodies the cooperative approach. The states work together, 
but have no legal obligation to do so or towards each other. Actions are only taken, 
and implementations only realised if the PS in question has the political willingness to 
do so. For this reason, many agreements have not been put into practice by various PS 
and they have no legal consequence to fear if failing to do so. In this case, the 
functioning of the OSCE as an organisation relies on the good will and collaboration 
of the Participating States. Also, the idea of sharing information on the 
implementation and their activities annually would be a sign for active cooperation. 
More transparency would exist between the PS, what can also be seen as confidence 
building measure.
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As this tick is about OSCE-internal treatment of commitments etc., it bears no relation 
to the EST. The signing parties of the treaty would be legally bound to their 
commitment while this is not the case for the Participating States in OSCE matters. 
The implementation of the OSCE norms, principles and commitments in the future 
depends on the Participating States and their willingness. The PS have realised that by 
taking this step, improvements in the whole OSCE can be made. All other ticks of the 
Corfu Process, representing the issues considered relevant and worth discussing 
depend on the implementation step subsequently to finding a solution in the form of a 
regulation or guideline. Another important measure will be to review the existing 
OSCE principles, commitments and norms. It has to be seen if they are still applicable 
and also their timeliness has to be checked. Agreements made in the early 1990s 
might be outdated, and reviewing them could change whole ways of procedure. This 
could make processes (like for example the conflict cycle) easier or even faster and 
increase the OSCEs effectiveness.   
6.1.2. The Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 
Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
Compared to the first, the second tick led to many discussions and a great deal of 
proposals and Fft-papers. The large amount of Participating States engaging in these 
issues showed the importance they have within this Process. Again, it was recognized 
that the OSCE lacks effectiveness although a large number of instruments for conflict 
prevention and resolution, crisis management, early warning and post-conflict 
rehabilitation are available, and it was stated that this area has to be improved. 
Especially the conflicts still existing in the OSCE area were highlighted. As the Corfu 
Process was created to restore trust between the Participating States and to create a 
security area free of dividing lines, these conflicts should finally be settled. 
Four sub-topics were identified as the most discussed issues. First, the need to 
strengthen the OSCE structures to act quicker and more effectively. Secondly, the 
need to look at the existing mechanisms and procedures of the OSCE, to that the 
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Participating States do not revert sufficiently. The toolbox should be revised on the 
timeliness of the tools, and maybe new principles could be added (for example when 
coming to issues such as national minorities). Also they should be homogenised, 
unifying principles for conflict management and prevention. Thirdly, it was realised 
that early action is of high priority in conflicts. In this discussion the decision-making 
process of the OSCE came up, since action can only be begun after the 
acknowledgment of a conflict. It was accentuated that the consensus principle has to 
be maintained and that the parties concerned by the conflict would have to give their 
consent to action. Some PS would concede the CiO and/or the institutions the 
advanced authority to decided upon whether to act or not, which would leave the 
decision-making process out of the discussion. The fourth point was the role of the 
PC, which was commonly agreed to be the central forum of the OSCE and thus 
should therefore be strengthened through closer cooperation with the FSC and more 
informal sessions. 
This tick is particularly cross-dimensional: it is linked to many other issues, through 
all dimensions. It can be seen that the comprehensive approach is of special 
importance here, as not only the mechanisms for well performed conflict prevention 
and resolution require that all sectors are taken into account but also the reason for 
conflicts can come from all sectors mentioned in the framework for analysis. 
Especially the societal, the political and the military sector are closely linked in 
conflicts in the Eastern regions. The OSCE region still has unresolved conflicts in 
areas with mostly “new” states, with a very divers ethnicity. In some of these 
unresolved conflicts, ethnical identity plays an essential role for the creation of a 
stable state, while in others simply typical interstate conflicts about territory prevail. 
However, the OSCE essentially expresses the comprehensive approach in this tick 
through “ ”.104
The cooperativeness of this tick is found in the willingness to cooperate more with the 
FSC but also in the procedural method of the PS approaching the issue. Informal 
consultations were held with experts to find solutions – a step outside the framework 
of the OSCE. Furthermore, not only Participating States wrote FfT-Papers on this 
tick. Also a NGO and an agency of another International Organisation were given the 
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possibility to contribute through a FfT-Paper. Both examples show that the 
cooperative security approach was put into practice through giving outside opinions a 
forum in an internal process. 
This tick has some important links to the EST. Being about how to handle a conflict 
and how to react when it occurs; parallels to the Security treaty proposed by the 
Russian Federation are obvious. First of all, with the signing of the EST, parties of the 
treaty are obliged through Art. 2.1. not to take any action against another party that 
would affect its security in any way, which can be seen as fundamental conflict 
prevention. Like the OSCE, the EST establishes mechanisms to settle (armed) 
conflicts when they arise between the parties of the treaty. Art. 7 of the treaty deals 
with the action that can be taken when an attack occurs. Namely, all parties to the 
treaty can consider an attack on one party as an attack to themselves and are 
legitimated through Art.7.2. to execute the right of self-defence in accordance with 
Art.51 of the UN Charta until the UN Security Council takes measures. In practice 
this would be a form of early action, as mentioned by the PS in the Corfu Process. 
Like in the OSCE, the parties to the treaty take decisions on actions unanimously, in 
an extraordinary conference that would be initiated in case of an attack. The EST also 
stipulates that if the attacker is party to the treaty “
.” 105 This 
article echoes the consensus-minus-one regulation of the OSCE. However, the 
discussions in the Corfu Process underlined the importance the consent of the parties 
concerned has. 
The restoration of trust and confidence within the OSCE area is essential for the 
continuation of this topic. Especially the pending conflicts in the OSCE area have to 
be highlighted. They still pose a threat to big parts of the OSCE area, especially in the 
east. The parties to the conflicts have to regain trust between each other and increase 
confidence. It will be essential to the whole development of the OSCE that these 
conflicts will be finally settled (in a peaceful way). That way, negotiations and 
decision-making in the OSCE will become easier and no clearly set fronts will arise 
concerning specific issues. It surely will be also partly the responsibility of the OSCE 
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to support the peace negotiation processes. Furthermore, the strengthening of the 
capabilities and structures the OSCE provides in conflict prevention, resolution, post-
conflict rehabilitation and crisis management will continue to be an important step to 
move forward in this tick. Here, the CiO, the secretariat and civil society could play a 
more important role through mediation and by providing information.
6.1.3. Role of the Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Regimes in 
Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment
This tick was considered by all PS to be particularly important for a functioning 
security in the OSCE area. The principles of the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security and the 1996 Framework for Arms Control were still 
seen as premises for arms control and CSBMs.106 Also, arrangements on a political 
but also legally binding basis, which are not necessarily part of the OSCE but within 
it’s umbrella are highly important. Here the CFE treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies and 
the Vienna Document of 1999 are named. An undermining of these arrangements 
could affect the whole OSCE region and have a negative effect on the cooperative, 
comprehensive and indivisible approach the OSCE takes towards security. Not only 
because of the openness and information exchange the States granted each other 
through them, these arrangements are crucial. They also contribute to conflict 
prevention and can help handling a crisis. The PS discussed furthermore that the 
existing instruments should be adapted to changing the security environment of the 
OSCE region. Here, regional conflict prevention, tackling of new threats to security 
and taking into account developments in capabilities and doctrines of the individual 
militaries were considered as possible ways of addressing the latter issue. 
The CFE regime was especially highlighted. In view of the fact that it is not an OSCE 
document per se, the parties to the treaty are responsible for resolving the issues here 
themselves. However, many OSCE Participating States are members to the regime 
and the crisis within thus affects trust and confidence among them. Therefore, its 
resolution would contribute to the Corfu Process. Moreover, adaptation of the Vienna 
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Document of 1999 has been discussed in the FSC and benefitted greatly from the 
Corfu discussions. Although no consensus could be found, a decision in the FSC on 
“Establishing a Procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna 
Document” was adopted. Moreover, it was decided, that the Corfu Process should 
dedicate thoughts to the UNSCR 1540, and the PS discussed which areas in the 
OSCE, old and new ones, should be strengthened in this context. 
The third tick is located exclusively in the first dimension and the military and 
political sector of the comprehensive framework of analysis. The FSC plays a big role 
in this tick, as do legally and politically binding commitments. Arms Control Regimes 
are still of great importance after the end of the Cold War, even if just to build and 
maintain trust between the states. Threats to military security in the comprehensive 
approach depend on the size and amount of equipment of armies. If they are being 
reduced, the threat they impose is too. The cooperative approach can be seen in the 
fact, that the PS act together and security is an issue addressed by all together. 
However, the cooperative approach only includes political and not legally binding 
commitments, and in this tick the Open Skies Treaty and the CFE treaty can be found 
which have legal implications. The concept of the indivisibility of security is also 
apparent in this tick as there are no two sides, but all sides (and PS) benefit from their 
cooperation. 
Although this tick is mainly about (the prevention of) military threats to security, it 
does not have as many parallels to the EST as one might think. First of all, the 
similarities: Art.1 of the European Security treaty engages the parties of the treaty to 
cooperate on the basis of indivisible, undiminished and equal security. As mentioned 
several times, these principles are part of the fundamental principles of the OSCE. All 
PS have an equal status and no state should resort to violence towards another state. 
Nonetheless, the EST underlines the indivisibility of security with the aim of legally 
securing this principle, whereas the Corfu Process does not aspire to draft a legally 
binding document. Art.3 of the draft EST gives the parties to the treaty the 
opportunity of requesting information on activities of other parties of the treaty. 
Anyhow, this request can only be made if the requesting party considers this action as 
a possible threat to its security. As no information exchange is stipulated previously, 
the treaty assumes distrust between the parties. 
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However, the mechanisms enshrined in Art.4 of the EST, which should help prevent 
conflicts and settle disputes among the parties to the treaty, are only consultations 
among the parties, conferences and extraordinary conferences. Also, Art.2.2. only 
foresees that parties to the treaty that are members of other alliances, coalitions or 
organisations should ensure that the latter act in accordance with documents decided 
by the OSCE, the UN Charta, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charta for European 
Security. It is however not mentioned that parties to the EST must act in accordance 
with those rules and principles.107 The third tick of the Corfu Process goes much 
further by including the CFE treaty and the UNSCR 1540 apart from considering the 
need to reform the existing OSCE documents which are relevant for this point.  
The future of the role of arms control and confidence and security building regimes 
depends very much on the CFE treaty. As mentioned by the PS in the discussions, the 
outcome of the CFE treaty discussions and the resolution of the present crisis are 
essential to the development of trust and confidence between the OSCE PS. 
Conventional arms control is an essential asset to the European security architecture, 
endorsing confidence between the parties to the CFE treaty and also to the OSCE PS. 
Furthermore, the renovation and modernisation of the Confidence and security 
building measures available to the OSCE, plays an important role in the future 
development of this tick. The first dimension might be the most developed one 
comparing all three dimensions, but it still needs some reinforcement to secure a 
stable security environment. 
6.1.4. Transnational and Multidimensional Threats and Challenges
The Corfu discussions started as the PS agreed on the importance of the role the 
OSCE plays in combating transnational and multidimensional threats and challenges. 
As a regional organisation, with a comprehensive approach to security from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok it was considered the ideal platform for such issues. 
New and uprising threats were found in cyber crime, drug trafficking and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as terrorism, and 
                                                  
107 Cf. Draft European Security Treaty.
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trafficking in human beings. The OSCE already possesses programs for confronting 
some of those issues; however a need to boost the activities was commonly identified. 
Anyhow, it was conceded by the PS that resources were limited and other actors 
would become more and more important. The OSCE should be placed in the spotlight 
again as a relevant actor in this field. 
The PS identified specific areas, which should be improved. First of all, the strategies 
and mandates of the OSCE could be renewed and adapted to current threats, also the 
possibility that new ones should be added was considered. Secondly, again the need 
for better coordination between the OSCE executive structures, institutions and also 
field operations was highlighted. This issue is meant here specifically for 
transnational and multidimensional threats but was identified as problematic in many 
other “ticks”, too. More cooperation is also a recurrent issue – the PS should 
cooperate more closely among each other and also with other international and 
regional organisations. The platform for cooperative security was highlighted as a 
possible framework for this. So, internal and external coordination and cooperation 
should be improved. As transnational threats are not limited to the OSCE area, 
consideration was also given to threats coming from outside. The improvement of 
border management skills and police training were possible ways of addressing these 
issues that were considered. Furthermore, a special focus on new areas should be 
created, and the possibilities for the OSCE to contribute in the field. 
As already highlighted by the PS, cooperation is a keyword in this tick. Cooperation 
has to exist not only between the PS but also between the OSCE PS and adjacent 
states. The comprehensive approach recognizes that the regionality of military 
security, and thus between states in a certain area (the OSCE region), might diminish 
through the advances in technology. It also is a particularly comprehensive tick, as the
expression “multidimensional threats” already indicates. Threats do not only concern 
military or political security, especially the economic but also societal and 
environmental sector have to be taken into account. Cyber crime for example can 
affect all areas, from private homes to government facilities. The same applies to 
terrorism, which can harm individual citizens but also entire nations. Thus, as stated 
by the PS, enhancing coordination and cooperation, thereby addressing the 
cooperative approach, is an important first step towards countering these issues. 
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It has to be emphasised again, that the draft treaty specifically only takes military and 
political threats to security into account. Furthermore, the treaty focuses on threats to 
the security of one country triggered by aggression from another country, thus inter-
state conflicts. However, transnational threats could be stopped through information 
exchange, which is explicitly mentioned in Art.3.1. of the draft EST:
“
.”108
Especially in the case of to transnational threats such as illicit drug trafficking, the 
introduction of measures by one state could affect another country’s security in a 
positive or also negative way. Still, transnational and multidimensional threats are not 
specifically mentioned in the EST.
Transnational threats are dangers that will not disappear in the near future. The OSCE 
has to establish clear fields of contribution and how to act in them. Especially new 
challenges such as cyber security require exploration. OSCE mandates and 
commitments will have to be updated and renewed. Threats like trafficking in illicit 
drugs and chemical precursors have to be tackled through a commonly decided 
approach. Money-laundering and financing of terrorism are issues that will have to be 
combated in a cooperative manner. Border security and management concepts will 
have to be updated to enable the PS to identify in particular the threats lying in illicit 
trafficking (ranging from human beings to WMD). Information sharing and enhanced 
cooperation and coordination between the PS and also the Partners for Cooperation is 
exceptionally crucial in this tick. The OSCE must not work alone but complement the 
work of other organisations active in this field. 
6.1.5. Economic and Environmental Challenges
The second dimension of the OSCE only was dedicated one tick solely for challenges 
in this field and will therefore get more attention than some other ticks. In general, 
one can say that there is much more emphasis on the other two dimensions. Although 
                                                  
108 Draft European Security Treaty, Art.3.1.
A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, […] information on any significant 
legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, 
which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security
70
all three dimensions are theoretically regarded as equally important, the economic and 
environmental dimension (EED) is left a little behind in practice. However, the PS 
underlined in the Corfu discussions that the second dimension is a substantial part of 
the OSCE, especially since it completes the comprehensive approach towards 
security. The PS made clear that they wished to strengthen this dimension, especially 
by implementing the recommendations the Chairmanship of 2009 had made in a 
report on the future orientation of this dimension. 
The Greek CiO had formulated 15 recommendations for improving the work in the 
second dimension. First of all, increased continuity would be needed; secondly, the 
 should continue to function as a basis for the work in the EED. 
Thirdly, the progress achieved since implementing the Strategy should be reviewed. 
Furthermore the PS were advised to shift the focus from one theme for each year to 
several core issues that would be dealt with over several years. However, the system 
of one topic should not be abolished but combined with the new system of several 
themes. The issues dealt with should be carefully selected. The Greek chairmanship 
suggested energy security; environment and security (water management and climate 
change); the global financial crisis; good governance (e.g. border security, anti-
corruption, anti-money laundering); migration; transport (this includes all sorts of 
anti-trafficking). Each of these six topics should have a chef de file109. Also, a closer 
link to the other dimensions should be established and more focus should lie on 
security aspects of these issues. Moreover, the EED should be better used as 
confidence building measure.110  
The recommendations made at the time are relevant to the Corfu Process, as the same 
issues remained pending. They had much support but some differences could not be 
solved and they were not adapted. The thematic fields, identified as relevant by the 
Greek chairmanship, were again highlighted by the PS during the Corfu discussions. 
Also, a link to the second tick, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation, was established and the role the EED 
could play in CSBMs was highlighted. From the FfT-papers and discussion released 
by the PS, it emerged that the 2009 Report on the Future Orientation of the Second 
                                                  
109 A Chef de File is in charge of one particular topic, coordinates actions and informs the other PS on 
activities in this matter.
110 Cf. Chairmanship’s Report, CIO.GAL/97/09.
Maastricht Strategy
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Dimension should be implemented and further tools and instruments should be 
developed. Another big topic and challenge for the second dimension is energy 
security. 
The comprehensiveness of the OSCE security approach can be found again in this 
tick. First of all, the actors related to economic security are can have many faces and 
different tasks when coming to securitizing, depending on the economic approach of 
the state. In case of the liberal governments, who normally oppose to much state 
involvement in the economy, banks collapsed and endangered the international 
(global) economy in the last couple of years.111 Focusing on the financial aspect of 
this tick again, further cooperation is needed between the PS to create regional ties 
like the comprehensive approach suggests, to have an auxiliary network in case of 
another breakdown. This also applies to commonly proclaimed threats such as climate 
change, which affects all PS and can only be fought in a cooperative manner. 
Although it is dedicated to economic and environmental challenges, the PS underlined 
in their discussions the interconnection between this tick and the second, early 
warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation. So again, one dimension never stands alone – all issues are 
interconnected and influenced positively as well as negatively by issues from other 
ticks and dimensions. On the cooperative side one can find contributions and FfT-
papers by partners concerning cooperation, so there is again input from outside the 
OSCE PS circle. 
Economic and environmental challenges are not included in the Russian draft for a 
European Security Treaty. The treaty is specifically designed for issues in the first 
OSCE dimension, while the fifth tick of the Corfu Process focuses mostly on the 
second dimension, also taking into account consequences which economic and 
environmental challenges can have on other OSCE issues.
Economic and environmental challenges will grow instead of decrease in the future 
and might therefore also become more and more important in the OSCE. Energy 
security, transport security and migration are essential issues that will continue to be 
                                                  
111 Cf. Buzan et al., 1998, p.100f. Buzan et al. predict in their framework what triggered the financial 
crisis of the last years. 
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discussed. Wide parts of the OSCE area are currently suffering from weak economies, 
which have to be modernised through cooperation and innovations in the economic 
and technological sector. Corruption is an extensive problem that has to be fought 
through good governance. The environment needs to be better protected and 
cooperation between the PS on human actions endangering the environment and 
natural catastrophes has to be improved. The tools the OSCE possesses in the second 
dimension have to be revised and adapted to the current challenges.      
6.1.6 Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms, as well as Democracy and the Rule 
of Law
This tick of course is interconnected with all other issues but stands alone as a single 
tick dedicated exclusively to issues of the human dimension. Respect of fundamental 
freedoms, human rights and democracy and rule of law is anchored in the OSCE 
funding principles. During the Corfu discussions, the PS commonly decided that the 
commitments made in this dimension should be fully implemented and were directly 
and legitimately relevant to all PS equally way. A recurring issue affecting this tick 
also is the lack of implementation by the PS. However, the deficits in the human 
dimension are especially visible. Freedom of the media (including responsible 
reporting, broadcasting pluralism, the need to combat violence against journalists); 
freedom of movement, assembly and association; non-discrimination; protection of 
national minorities and migrants, and combating trafficking in human beings are 
issues that still have not been resolved across all of the OSCE area. Many PS have not 
yet applied to practice the commitments made in the OSCE. Therefore, it was 
highlighted that the political will and objective analysis of the problems would be 
essential for resolving these issues. Meetings had to be made more effective and 
mechanisms reinforced as well as new ones introduced. Election observation also was 
named as important part of the OSCE activities in the third dimension. For improving 
the work in all these fields closer cooperation with NGOs and civil society was 
considered, also it was underlined that it should be avoided to redo the work of other 
international organisations. Moreover, the legal framework of the OSCE should be 
strengthened.  Details on the legal questions will be discussed in the next tick. To 
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make implementation of the OSCE commitments easier, the PS considered a support 
system that could be based on reviews. Furthermore, it was suggested to strengthen 
the cooperation with other organisations, in particular the UN and the Council of 
Europe.  
This tick embodies the comprehensive as well as the cooperative approach to security. 
On the one hand the societal sector is the most interconnected one, depending so 
much on activities in other sectors; on the other hand cooperation is needed very 
strongly to fulfil the commitments made in the Human Dimension. Especially national 
minorities are an important issue in the OSCE, which unites a multiplicity of ethnic 
and identity groups. Although originating from very different problems, societal 
security issues can be traced back in most cases to identity issues – a problem that 
easily spreads across borders and is carried to another sector – the military one. 
Moreover, the second large issue in this tick is the media, “
”112. The comprehensive 
approach sees the media as a decisive actor in this field.
This tick again has no parallels at all with the Russian European Security Treaty. The 
Russian Federation claims, that the issues the humanitarian dimension and partly also 
the Corfu Process deal with have been exploited by western countries at the expense 
of other baskets. For this reason the Council of Europe is included in their list of 
relevant security organizations as the Council is known for focusing on Human Rights 
issues and possesses legally binding instruments in this field. 113 Anyhow, also the 
Russian Federation sees a need to face current security issues with a comprehensive 
approach, as they are multidisciplinary problems. Still, they should not be dealt with 
in one single treaty in their opinion, this way focus on the single issues could get lost. 
Politico-military, economic and environmental and humanitarian issues could be dealt 
with separately to avoid dispersal.114
Therefore, the EST focuses exclusively on politico-military security issues and no 
references to the human dimension or its issues are being made. 
                                                  
112 Cf. Buzan et al., 1998, p.124.
113 Cf. Klijn, 2010, p.158.
114 Cf. Statement by H.E. Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Grushko, 
 FSC-PC.DEL/9/09, p.4. 
an important actor that 
contributes significantly to the definition of situations
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The third dimension is the most discussed and contested one of the OSCE. Many PS 
have still not been able to reach the standards set. Human rights, fundamental 
freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are topics that would typically be seen as 
western assets. However, in the whole of the OSCE these issues are still of relevance. 
Still, they are seen as essential to developing democratic and free societies, which are 
still at the core of the comprehensive approach to security the OSCE has chosen for 
itself. The commitments the PS have made have to be implemented and consultations 
have to be carried out to fully make the Human Dimension work. Freedom of 
assembly, gender equality and independent jurisdiction are only some issues that will 
have to become standard in the whole OSCE region. Especially freedom of expression 
through the media, as well as combating discrimination and intolerance are topics that 
need further commitments and actions. Here the protection of national minorities, of 
which the OSCE area is rich, and a thorough confrontation with IDPs and refugees 
will be essential. Issues such as trafficking in human beings are of transnational 
nature, a threat to all OSCE PS, will also need more consideration. Moreover, the 
OSCE PS might consider freer movement of persons across the whole OSCE region.
6.1.7. Enhancing the OSCE’s Effectiveness
This tick is especially linked to all other themes discussed in the Corfu Process. As 
put down in the previous points, the effectiveness of the OSCE plays an important 
role in each tick and dimension and is therefore dependent on the developments made 
in the other ticks. For this reason, a group of PS especially interested in reforming the 
OSCE formulated an extraordinarily large number of Fft-papers.
During the discussions, it was decided that in order to enhance the OSCE’s 
effectiveness, two elements would be essential: re-restored trust between the PS and 
improved work processes in the OSCE institutions. In the discussions the PS 
identified approaches to resolve this issue. One would be to make the OSCE a more 
important political forum. If the PS would fall back more on the OSCE and use it 
more for joint action, future challenges could be met more easily. Also, the executive 
structures of the OSCE would have to be strengthened. Different opinions on how to 
address this tick emerged. Some PS considered that unified procedures and 
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standardised executive structures would bring about a greater degree of transparency. 
In this way, misunderstandings and double standards could be avoided. Efficient work 
in the decision-making bodies and during their meetings would also improve the work 
in the organisation. Other PS found that with a more effective OSCE, new and future 
challenges could be encountered. The cross-dimensional approach would have to be 
outlined in a better way and all commitments made should be implemented, especially 
the conflict prevention and resolution capabilities. Tangible proposals on the 
strengthening were, among others, better planning of programs and budgets, time- and 
labour-saving preparations of OSCE MC Meetings, formulating guidelines for field 
operation activities, coordination of the cooperation with NGOS and the introduction 
of a mechanism for assessing field operations. Internal regulations on e.g. the periods 
of service or the secondment system were decided to be discussed in the relevant body 
or institution of the OSCE. 
In the discussions also the “weakness” of the OSCE, as some consider it, came up: its 
legal status. A proposal for a basic constituent document was put forward by a group 
of PS and also became a matter for discussion in all other ticks of the Corfu Process. 
The idea was to give the OSCE a legal personality. These PS suggested through 
granting OSCE staff privileges and immunities through a convention, the OSCE could 
increase its effectiveness. 
In this tick the theoretical framework of the OSCE is especially visible. The PS 
agreed to cooperate first through a conference, and today in an organisation. The 
cooperative approach, which relies on voluntary cooperation and is based on political 
rather than legal commitments, would not be given any longer if a constituent 
document and thereby, a legal personality were to be introduced. If on the contrary the 
political relevance of the OSCE were to be strengthened without adding a legally 
binding agreement, the cooperative approach could be (re-) confirmed. The OSCE 
began life with the cooperation between the then opposing two blocks – the NATO 
states and the Warsaw pact and today the actual effectiveness of the OSCE relies on 
the will to implement the commitments that were made towards each other on this 
cooperative basis. The comprehensive approach can be found in the need to 
implement all commitments in all dimensions, as well as in the need to strengthen the 
cross-dimensional approach the PS had identified during the discussions.  
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The idea to strengthen the OSCE by introducing a basic constituent document can be 
related to the EST, which explicitly entitles other parties to the treaty to draw 
consequences if the imposed rules are violated. The proposal made in this tick and the 
draft treaty share the idea to create a legally binding basis for European security. 
However, the draft EST only sets regulations for intra-state treatment, while the idea 
proclaimed for and in the OSCE goes further and wants to introduce privileges and 
immunities to the organisations’ staff, thus aiming to introduce formal directives not 
only contextual ones.  
The OSCE effectiveness will have to be increased and improved to face 21st century 
challenges. Many different factors will have to be altered, like the decision-making 
process, budgetary planning, the work of the field operations and the OSCE 
programme. In this tick also the role of the Chairmanship will be of importance in the 
future. The legal framework could be strengthened and maybe even a legal 
personality could be provided for the OSCE. Furthermore, the provision of 
information in a timely manner to the PS is crucial in order to improve awareness 
raising and enable rapid response. The OCSE secretariat could get an enhanced 
supporting role and civil society could be involved more, especially in situations of 
conflict and crisis. Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly could be involved more by 
using its proficiency and experience.
6.1.8. Interaction with other Organizations and Institutions on the Basis of the 1999 
Platform for Co-operative Security
This tick again highlighted the importance of the implementation of the commitments 
made in the past. Once more, actual commitments for this purpose were already made. 
Only very few FfT-papers were presented by the PS. During the discussions, the PS 
pointed out that they wanted to improve the cooperation with other organisations and 
institutions making better use of the Platform for cooperative security, which had 
been introduced in 1999. Also the Maastricht Strategy of 2003, which addresses 
threats to Security and stability in the Twenty-First Century, and the Athens 
Ministerial Declaration of December 2009 indicated further directions for possible 
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collaboration and should be taken into account. In the Corfu discussions, guidelines 
for this cooperation-building process were subsequently discussed and it was agreed 
to focus on particular topics and concerns in all three dimensions. A particular focus 
was put on transnational threats and conflict prevention and resolution. International, 
regional, sub-regional organisations and institutions that would act in a specific region 
or special field should be taken into account. It was emphasised that a comprehensive 
approach without any discrimination against relevant actors should be applied. Also 
cooperation should take place on a sensible basis, identifying the specific needs and 
tackling them. Cooperation with other organisations should be made more efficient by 
joint actions and united efforts without redoing the others work. Cooperation could 
take the form of sharing best practices, comparing experiences in operations, and 
strategic assessments. Especially the Asian and Mediterranean Partners for 
Cooperation and adjacent regions to the OSCE area were highlighted as particularly 
important partners. Afghanistan for example, being a breeding ground for 
transnational threats, is a field where many issues have to be tackled. 
The cooperative approach to security can be closely related to the cooperation with 
other organisations and institutions. Not only the PS find a common goal or threat that 
has to be fought, but also entire organisations, thus several states. Through 
cooperation threats to security of the particular region or also the whole OSCE area 
can be averted. Their cooperation is based on political commitments and not legal 
ones, and the OSCE itself highlights that cooperation with Partners and other 
organisations and institutions is included in their interpretation of their cooperative 
approach. 
The goal of the European Security Treaty is to enhance security between the parties to 
the treaty. In article 1 of the treaty the parties agree not to take measures – also in IOs 
where they are members – that would threaten the security of other parties to the 
treaty in any way. To ensure each other’s security is also the goal of the cooperation 
of the OSCE and other institutions and organisations, however the main target is not 
to avoid threats to security but to tackle already existing ones. In the EST it is 
assumed that threats to security come from other states or organisations, it is a treaty 
only shaped for inter-state treatment. The Corfu Process by contrast reverts to the 
comprehensive approach, considering threats from all sectors and all three 
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dimensions. This is why cooperation with other relevant actors is sought. 
The 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security will very likely continue to serve as a 
basis for the OSCE to interact with other organisations and institutions. Many fields 
cannot be addressed alone, especially when looking at issues such as transnational 
threats. That the new challenges the world is facing have to be confronted together 
was also realised by the OSCE PS. The Mediterranean and Asian Partners for 
Cooperation could be involved more and the OSCE also could work as a coordinating 
framework for cooperation between security organisations collaborating on an equal 
basis in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. Information exchange could be 
conducted through it, comparing the most suitable practices and effective endeavours. 
Joint activities will surely increase, regular exchange between the collaborating 
parties could take place and also new contacts could be developed. 
6.1.9. The Cross-Dimensional Approach to Security
This tick was discussed by the PS together with the first tick, “implementation of all 
OSCE norms, principles and commitments”. Several ideas on how to tackle this issue 
emerged. More cooperation between the PC and the FSC by holding joint meetings 
and having joint decisions, CSBMs in the non-military field and the potential of the 
OSCE to confront root-causes of conflicts were discussed. The proposal to strengthen 
the role of the HCNM as well as the suggestion to focus more on IDPs and refugees 
came up. Furthermore, transnational threats were a topic of discussion too, as a cross-
dimensional approach could deliver answers to this issue. Gender-related issues were 
discussed as a possible key area across all dimensions as well as root causes for 
conflict situations arising from issues of the economic, environmental and human 
dimension. Although the cross-dimensional approach to security did not educe many 
Fft-papers, the discussion evolved into two directions:  
While all PS agreed on the equal importance all three dimensions have for and in the 
OSCE, some PS claimed that the different dimensions were addressed with an 
unequal amount of attention and links between the dimensions were artificially 
established. Other PS claimed that the lack of implementation of some commitments 
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would lead to more focus on those areas where the implementations had not been 
made. 
Furthermore, some PS considered the Corfu Process as an opportunity to investigate 
how communities with a certain risk of being displaced react to conflict issues and 
how to prevent displacement and include those communities in conflict resolution 
processes. This could happen through cooperation with the UNHCR. 
The practical cross-dimensional approach to Security of the OSCE incorporates the 
theoretical comprehensive approach. Ideally, all factors are being included when 
dealing with preventing or handling conflict situations. Not only military factors but 
also economic, environmental and humanitarian issues are taken into account. 
Moreover, it was realised that refugees and IDPs can weaken a country from inside 
and cause societal instability and, in this context, identity insecurity. Especially OSCE 
PS in the east still are still quite vulnerable in this respect and partly struggle with 
national identity problems. Even a small admixture from outside to such a society 
could cause issues and can easily lead to a conflict. To search for the root causes of 
issues can have a preventive effect. More joint work and action between the PC and 
the FSCE, two of the most important forums for cooperation between the PS in the 
OSCE, can be very helpful in this matter and also underlines the comprehensive 
approach. 
The EST takes a very different approach towards security than is sought through the 
cross-dimensional approach. The Russian draft focuses exclusively on the military 
and political aspects and moreover on inter-state relationship. While the OSCE cross-
dimensional approach looks for root-causes of conflicts in the other two dimensions, 
the EST solely attempts to prevent violations of security from one state to another. 
Other organisations where parties of the treaty are members are also included in this 
effort of securitizing; however internal problems of a state (which can often spill over 
to neighbouring countries through factors such as migration and/or refugees) are not 
taken into consideration.
The OSCE will surely continue to take a cross-dimensional approach to security. In 
all documents the importance of the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE is highlighted 
and looking at the ways of approaching issues, it might not have reached the ideal 
setting but will surely continue moving in this direction in the next years. Although 
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some PS complain about the fact that there is more focus on some dimensions than on 
others, all agree that it is the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE that makes its 
comprehensive approach work.  
6.1.10. General Questions of Euro-Atlantic Security
From Vancouver to Vladivostok countries with very different backgrounds in 
historical, cultural and especially political terms can be found. The PS indicated in the 
Corfu discussions that for this reason divisions from inside may be possible and also 
threats from outside such as terrorism or spill-over issues from adjacent countries 
(Afghanistan was especially outlined during the discussions) represent a danger to the 
OSCE area. 
The comprehensive, cooperative and especially the indivisible approach the PS 
commonly agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act was highlighted again and it was 
underlined that it had been strengthened through the Charta of Paris for a new Europe 
as well as other treaties. The common framework for security was pointed out to be 
crucial but still not at the peak of its development. The PS are still not completely 
united and again the lack of implementation of commitments was accentuated. Also 
they acknowledged that challenges in the arms control regime are arising and the 
principle of indivisibility of security has become a topic again, looking at the EST. 
The PS came to a common objective to create a security community, which would be 
free of dividing lines and different levels of security within the OSCE area, where no 
use of force could or would take place. This community would deal with hard and soft 
security issues, would allow PS to be members of alliances which they could choose 
freely and at the same time be compatible with the concept of indivisibility of 
security, not enhancing their own security at the expense of that of another PS.
 During the discussions a possible action plan that could be adopted at the Astana 
Summit came up and the idea had a lot of support. The suggestion was that the action 
plan should strengthen the arms control regimes, enhance the capacities to encounter 
crises and conflicts, support the implementation of the commitments by the PS, 
provide a strategy against transnational threats, intensify cooperation with other 
organisations and strengthen the OSCE’s institutions. Basically the action plan should 
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include first solutions and steps towards encountering all issues that were discussed 
during the Corfu Process across all ticks.
This tick sums up the challenges and issues raised during the Corfu discussions. It 
puts a focus on the theoretical framework the OSCE has built up since its foundation 
as CSCE and makes a step farther towards not only an international security 
organisation but also a security community. Again the comprehensive approach is 
underlined and the cooperative approach is visible in the goal to work more closely 
with other organisations. Indivisibility of security is highly important in this tick, 
looking at the aim to unite all PS in a security community free of violence. 
The EST is specifically mentioned in the general questions of Euro-Atlantic security, 
as it promotes the indivisibility of security. The draft treaty made visible that a debate 
on indivisible security in the European and Eurasian area is pending and needed. 
However, the OSCE approaches it in a quite different way than the Russian draft 
treaty. While the EST mainly speaks of the indivisible approach, the OSCE also 
includes soft security issues and tackles this issue with its comprehensive framework. 
In the near future especially Afghanistan will become an important topic in general 
questions of Euro-Atlantic security. The OSCEs contribution to the stability inside the 
country and border management between Afghanistan and the adjacent OSCE 
countries will certainly play a role. Also the cooperation with the OSCE Partners for 
Cooperation will probably intensify over this issue. Concerning the possibility of 
founding a Security community, it remains to be seen in which directions the 
discussions and the follow up process of the Corfu Process will go under the 
Lithuanian chairmanship until the end of 2011.  
6.2. Conclusion
Over all one can say that the pending conflicts in the OSCE region dominated the 
discussions from the backdrop. Bearing in mind that the situation in Transniestria, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have not been 
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resolved, the focus of the discussions can be easily understood. Most ticks derive 
from conflict prevention and resolution, or are linked to this topic in the course of 
discussions. An attempt to give the OSCE again importance as securitizing institution 
in Europe and Euroasia could be one way of looking at it. The view is rather deflating, 
as it can also appear as if the OSCE had no other reason to exist than to resolve these 
conflicts. Another view and the more idealistic one, is that the Corfu Process will 
change the European Security architecture through giving the OSCE more importance 
and boosting it as regional security organisation. 
One thing is obvious, the PS have realised that the OSCE cannot stand alone in 
tackling the problems that are being faced from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
Cooperation with other organisations is essential, work has to be done through joint 
action - not only with the UN as the biggest international organisation, but also 
smaller regional organisations and institutions have to be included in the OSCEs’ 
efforts. 
It may seem that following the comprehensive approach, the PS should only fully 
implement the commitments they have made over the last three decades and security 
in the OSCE region would be fully achieved. All ticks of the Corfu Process derive at 
least partly from the lack of implementation of commitments by the PS. However, 
many factors have to be taken into account here. Probably the most important and 
obvious one is that every country in this area has different policies and considers 
different things relevant. The EU states may have a similar view on some issues, 
nevertheless national interests can still prevail and lead to divergence from the 
common opinion. Some PS are still very traditional and/or lack implementation of 
some commitments for religious reasons. With countries east of Vienna this is even 
more strongly the case – some of them still lean against bigger states, looking for 
support in their interests and matters. Others function exactly opposite and make 
attempts to stand alone and independent in the political arena of the OSCE. Many 
different factors lead to this positioning, some for economic reasons, and some for 
energy security reasons. Other reasons date back twenty years or longer.
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7. Possible Future Developments
7.1. The Astana Summit
The Astana Summit from 1st to 2nd December 2010 was the first OSCE summit in 
eleven years. Generally, high expectations were had in the forefront as it was a chance 
to change things. Still, many of the Heads of State of the Participating States did not 
attend the summit, a fact that troubled the atmosphere, and the failure to adopt a 
concrete proposal, which would restyle the OSCE at least partly lead to general 
deception. However, the 
 was realised, reconfirming the OSCE’s comprehensive and indivisible 
approach to security. Although no new arrangements or fundamental changes were 
made in this declaration, it was an important and positive step that the Participating 
States reconfirmed their Aquis of 1975. 
In the Declaration, the OSCE’s commitment to its comprehensive, cooperative and 
indivisible approach to security is highlighted and reconfirmed. Especially the 
indivisibility of security is pointed out. The PS declare that their security is 
inseparably linked to one another, all have the right to choose freely their security 
arrangements or to remain neutral. Furthermore neither states, nor groups of states, 
nor other organisations have the right to take over the responsibility for security in the 
whole region and of course they pledge not to strengthen their security at the expense 
of others. The Astana Declaration has no legal personality, so no PS will face 
consequences if violating this commitment, but renewing this commitment at least set 
a sign.
Another important fact is the reaffirmation by the PS that their commitments made in 
the Human Dimension do not only concern the internal affairs of a state but are 
subject of relevance to all PS.115 This way, the importance of the third dimension was 
highlighted after having had many discussions about lately. Moreover, in this way 
civil society or regional organisations working in this field have a document to resort
                                                  
115 Cf. Astana Declaration, 2010, par. 6.
Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security 
Community
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to towards their national governments.    
An action plan like the one proposed in the 10th tick “General Questions of Euro-
Atlantic Security” had been realised by the Participating States (PS) and elaborated at 
the Astana Summit during long night-sessions. However, an agreement between the 
PS was not found and the action plan could not get adopted. While in the Corfu 
Process the different issues were divided into separate ticks, the action plan addressed, 
in a comprehensive manner and even if in separate chapters, possible challenges and 
changes the single issues are related to. 
The Astana summit was the first in eleven years and but the outcome is not very 
significant. Some see the problem in the fact that Kazakhstan was been given the 
Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 in first place. A country that could not fully stand 
behind the commitments of the third, human, dimension was only been granted the 
leadership of the OSCE for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons. Afghanistan and 
Iraq, two of the big “problem areas” in the world could be brought into focus more 
easily: the natural resources of the country, and thus promotion of energy security; 
and prevailing over the disagreements between the western post-soviet states and the 
Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries were some of the reasons named 
for the Kazakh Chairmanship.116 At the same time, Kazakhstan repeatedly failed to 
introduce democratic and fundamental rights according to its commitments. Anyhow, 
it has to be stated that Kazakhstan stood by its commitment to strengthen ODIHR. 
Furthermore, it was the first time that a Central Asian country was chairing the OSCE 
– an organisation that repeatedly stressed that its area of influence reaches from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok and not only from Vancouver to Vienna.
One of the reasons for which the Astana action plan could not be adopted was that it 
contained points, which countries suffering from protracted conflicts could not 
possibly accept. Thus, these countries blocked the decision-making process and the 
adoption of this version of the action plan. However, it has to be noted that several big 
states could hide behind the disapproval of those conflict-ridden states. That several 
points in the action plan would not be acceptable for the countries with protracted 
                                                  
116 Cf. Zhovtis, 2010, p. 255f.
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conflicts was clear at an early stage, so these big states did not have to intervene 
themselves and could remain in the background. The US for example had signalised 
that it would not be accomplished some weeks before the Astana summit by not 
formulating the adoption of the action plan as one of their goals for the summit.  
7.2. After Astana
It appears that the OSCE has been losing importance over the last years. More and 
more OSCE participating states are NATO and/or EU member states and both 
organisations have planned further enlargements. Obviously both have greater assets 
coming to military resources as well as political and economic influence. 
Still, their expansion has limits within the OSCE region, both geographically and 
geopolitically and the OSCE will remain of great importance to those Participating 
States who are likely not become members of either one of the two “western” 
organisations somewhere soon.117
After Astana the dialogue on a new security architecture and renovation of the OSCE 
has not ended. In the  the incoming 
Chairmanship was requested to organise a follow-up process, taking into account the 
issues and topics discussed by the PS in the Corfu Process and the preparatory talks 
for the Summit.118 The Lithuanian Chairmanship follows the assignment and makes 
talks continue in a way similar to that in which the Corfu Process dialogues were held. 
They are referred to as “ ” – Vancouver to Vladivostok, via Vienna and 
Vilnius, and aim to build on the work that was realised during the Corfu Process. The 
talks are being held in the form of informal ambassadorial meetings and discussions, 
and are partly followed by events on the topic. These events address issues across all 
dimensions and can be hosted by think tanks, experts from academia or NGOs, and be 
co-sponsored by PS. Examples are workshops organised by the International Peace 
Institute (IPI) in cooperation with the Chairmanship.   
                                                  
117 Cf. Ghebali, p.63.
118 Cf. Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, 2010, par. 12.
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To show what these V-to-V dialogues (could) look like, the second tick of the Corfu 
Process, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation will serve as an example. The Lithuanian Chairmanship 
gives great importance to this issue and highlighted it as a priority during their time in 
office. The Chairmanship considers the OSCE a distinctive forum for dealing with 
those issues and thinks they should remain at the top of the OSCE’s agenda. Already 
during the Corfu Process it could be seen that this particular issue is of special 
importance to the PS. 16 proposals to this tick were put forward. Also, the Crisis in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010 had shown the OSCE that their mechanisms for conflict and crisis 
prevention and resolution were not fully functional and needed further development.  
To continue the talks after Astana, an informal ambassadorial meeting was already 
held in March to discuss the further development of this former tick. The framework 
for action that could not be approved in Astana helps as orientation on the themes and 
issues the PS generally want to tackle. The Lithuanian Chairmanship issued in the 
forefront a paper to encourage discussions, suggesting themes and areas that could be 
explored. Also expert-level events were planed to be held over the period of several 
months, to support the discussions. During the first meeting at the ambassadorial level 
it was agreed to use the proposals made during the Corfu discussions as well as the 
draft Astana framework for action as a basis for further talks. In general the wish for 
taking action and making final decisions was noticed among many PS. Political 
decisions should be forwarded to the responsible bodies on a case by case basis and 
others which only require approval of OSCE executive structures should, if possible, 
be put into action in the course of this year. While all issues discussed during the 
Corfu Process were explored, including possible ways of action, it was commonly 
decided that in this particular tick no need for additional mechanisms was needed 
(which had been considered during the preceding dialogues). The existing ones 
should, however, be reviewed and reconsidered. 
Also, an expert level meeting was already held on 15 April 2011. Five speakers had 
been invited, who were from the academia or relevant OSCE institutions. They made 
contributions to the topic “Enhancing the Early Warning and Analytical Capacity of 
the OSCE” and also formulated recommendations on how to deal with it. It was 
decided to appoint a coordinator for this specific issue (like the Chef-de-file during 
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the Corfu Process), to facilitate the follow-up of the meeting and the continuation of 
the discussions.   
Anyhow, it has to be recalled that even if enthusiasm to take action could be noticed, 
the further steps and possible decision-making process still depends on the will of the 
PS to collaborate and cooperate.
The next point in time where a real outcome of this dialogue on a new European 
security architecture will be seen, is the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius in 
December 2011. Here the CiO will present the work that has actually taken place in 
the OSCE under the Lithuanian Chairmanship. Further developments can be expected 
under the Irish Chairmanship in 2012 and it will be very interesting to see in which 
direction the Ukrainian Chairmanship will go in 2013. Considering the initiation of 
the Corfu Process in 2009 and the non-accomplishment to find an agreement until the 
end of 2010, the Chairmanship of 2013 might still get the chance to alter something in 
the discussions on a new OSCE and Eurasian security architecture.  Especially the 
Eurasian security architecture will probably become an important issue in the OSCE 
in the closer future, considering the unstable situation in countries like Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.119
7.3. The EST
It is highly improbable that the Russian Federation should have expected the EST to 
be adopted by all the states. The treaty contains many ambiguities and therefore 
leaves a big margin for interpretation. It gives Russia a power of veto over a large 
territory, a fact that western states would probably not accept, at least at this moment. 
Furthermore, it is not very likely that the western countries will engage into entering a 
common security zone with the Russian Federation. Too many issues remain 
unsolved, such as Georgia, energy security issues, and the Russian unilateral 
suspension of the CFE Treaty. The latter is especially relevant when looking at the 
EST: Russia has since then only partly fulfilled the commitments made in the CFE 
treaty. Through the breach of this security regime Russia becomes an unreliable 
                                                  
119 Cf. Kuchins, 2011. 
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partner for discussing new contracts.120 Further developments will therefore depend to 
a certain degree on the developments in the CFE discussions. At the moment the 
Russian Federation has resumed discussions but still persists in its demand that all 
parties to the treaty have to ratify the adapted CFE. Only after this Russia will resume 
its participation. 
While it is clear that the Russian Federation has to be involved when shaping the 
security architecture in Europe in order for it to be able to meet the current challenges, 
the general attitude Russia is showing the western states makes it rather uncertain that 
the EST will be adopted. 
                                                  
120 Cf. Schroedel, 2010, p.4.
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8. Conclusion
The OSCE is an organisation which was originally founded to provide a platform for 
dialogue and cooperation between the East and the West – from Vladivostok to 
Vancouver. This role was of particular importance in the time of the cold war, but the 
situation has changed drastically since the fall of the iron curtain. Having developed 
from a conference to an international security organisation, the OSCE went on to pass
through many stages and experience many transitions. 
The OSCE’s comprehensive and cooperative approach towards security surely 
represents a crucial asset of the Organisation – it is what defines the OSCE. No other 
organisation orients itself on an academic theoretical framework. The comprehensive 
approach is what makes the OSCE particularly special: through its structure of three 
dimensions it attempts to include all aspects which might potential cause conflict. The 
politico-military dimension deals with “hard” security issues, while the second and 
especially the third dimension tackle the “soft” issues. However, only the 
inclusiveness in approaching threats to security in the OSCE region makes this 
organisation exceptional. Especially considering the very different standards of living, 
multiple ethnicities and religions, and also the political and military agendas of the 56 
OSCE PS, a comprehensive approach is needed in order to be able to cope with the 
variety of problems that could endanger the common security. A variety of issues 
from very different sectors come together when talking about security nowadays –
this includes military threats but also energy security, food security, economic and 
environmental threats and human security. To enable a secure and stable environment, 
the OSCE PS have developed a large number of guidelines, principles and codes of 
conduct in line with their theoretical framework, including aspects from all three 
dimensions, over the last decades.
In late 2008, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev presented the idea to launch a 
new European Security Treaty in order to replace the old instruments dealing with
security and create new guarantees for non-use-of-force as well as improved 
cooperation in countering new forms of security threats. However, this draft version 
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of a treaty had too many inconsistencies, leaving loopholes allowing states to attack 
each other so that western states could not possibly agree to it. 
However, the call for a pan-European summit to discuss a legally binding treaty on 
European security by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was the trigger for 
discussing major changes in the OSCE. European security needed strengthening and 
required a new framework, as the existing one failed to meet current challenges.
Unresolved problems, like ongoing conflicts, still existed and created a threat to 
stability and security in the OSCE area. 
Therefore, when the „Corfu Process“ was launched half a year later under the Greek 
OSCE chairmanship on the island of Corfu at an informal OSCE foreign ministers’ 
meeting, it tackled the problems and challenges of European security and introduced 
an open dialogue on security within the framework of the OSCE with the aim to 
restore confidence and trust among the OSCE participating states.  
In December 2009 a ministerial council was held in Athens, where Decision No. 1/09 
was made for „ ". The discussions on what could be 
reformed and improved in the OSCE had got an official framework. Over a period of 
almost two years discussions were held and ideas were gathered. The Participating 
States engaged in an active dialogue, taking all three OSCE dimensions into 
consideration. 
The Astana summit, which had been expected to make a fundamental change, turned 
out to be a deception for most PS. However, the Corfu Process had had an important 
impact on the organisation itself. The PS had (re-) started a dialogue and actively tried 
to find solutions to current issues and challenges. Although the proposed Action Plan 
could not be adopted, dialogues continue in the OSCE and for the moment it seems 
that the PS have the will to take action and start making actual changes. 
Theoretically the OSCE should be able to confront most security issues in a fast and 
inclusive way through its mechanisms and instruments. However, in order to be able 
to face today’s threats and challenges, all commitments, norms and principles that 
have been made across these three dimensions have to be implemented by all PS. So 
far many PS have failed to do so, because they do not have to fear any sanctions. 
Anyhow, it seems that the PS have realised over the last years through the Corfu 
Furthering the Corfu Process
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discussions that the implementation is essential for progress in the OSCE. If they 
fulfil their commitments now, a big step towards a working comprehensive security 
approach will be made.  Moreover, especially the second and in particular the highly 
debated third dimension have to be given more importance by all PS in order to create 
a basis for a functioning discussion. Issues related to all three dimensions have to be 
worked on more intensively and cooperating with other International Organisations 
will become more important in order to facilitate the course of action and enhance the 
outcome. Furthermore, peace in Europe will not be increased without looking closer 
at minority issues. Here, as well as with all other issues, interaction has to be based on 
a number of commonly agreed principles to facilitate communication and discussions.  
It is clear that the Corfu Process is not just an answer to the Russian draft
but can go far beyond it. While the Corfu Process discusses issues 
across all dimensions, trying to find solutions to old, pending conflicts and new 
threats and challenges, the EST only deals with inter-state affairs. The EST seeks to 
create a zone free of military threats in Eurasia through a treaty, while the Corfu 
Process could naturally establish this zone through commitments in all dimensions. 
Current issues in security are not really addressed in the EST, instead it is designed to 
establish an area of influence which is to include not only states but also 
organisations, like NATO. In this way ex parte decisions by NATO for example 
would be avoided and other organisations like CSTO or the CIS would enhance their 
status. Indivisibility of security is highlighted as an asset of substantial importance to
the treaty, which provides for a council to discuss further proceedings in case of 
transgression. However, the treaty is mainly a code of conduct for troops, 
disregarding topics the Russian Federation prefers not to deal with, like democratic
control or arms control. While the EST was a treaty proposed by one country, the 
Corfu Process was a process in which all PS sought solutions together, with the aim to 
restore trust among each other. The opposing sides can be brought together through 
inclusion in the dialogue, seeking compromises together and learning about the other 
parties’ wishes and goals through discussions. Anyhow, the Russian proposal made it 
clear that the principle of indivisibility needs reconfirmation. In the 
 the PS make a first step towards it, reconfirming the 
principle and putting special prominence to it. Still, the time has not yet come to agree 
on a legally binding document which would commit the PS to a security zone from 
 European 
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Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since the OSCE Summit in Astana, the 
 has not been subject to any official discussion in the OSCE. 
Harm Hazewinkel sums up well the situation in the OSCE by saying: “
”121 The keyword for progress in the OSCE is political will – as long as 
the PS collaborate and cooperate, work will be done. This only happens on a 
voluntary basis and with the current regulations for decision-making already a little 
group of countries disagreeing can stop the cog in the wheel. Shared values are 
therefore the key to communication between the PS and functioning discussions. 
Apart from the particular national governments and their policies, it is up to the next 
Secretary General of the OSCE and countries chairing the OSCE, as well as the 
Chairperson in Office, to support decision finding processes and moderate discussions 
between the Participating States in the future. The Corfu Process was an excellent 
way to begin a dialogue between the Participating States but has by far not ended. 
                                                  
121 Hazewinkel, 2010, p.151.
European Security 
Treaty
The OSCE has 
up until now always been able to come up with some solutions, as long as political 
will existed.
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Glossary of Acronyms
CFE – Conventional armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CIS – Community of Independent States
CSBMs – Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE – Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EED – Economic and environmental dimension
EST – European Security Treaty
EU – European Union
Fft-Papers – Food-for-Thought Papers
FSC – Forum for Security Cooperation
HCNM – High Commissioner on National Minorities
IDPs – internally displaced persons
MC – Ministerial Council 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PC – Permanent Council
PS – Participating States
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
WMD – Weapons of mass destruction
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Annex
A.1.
MC.DOC/1/09
2 December 2009
MC(17) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8
1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the 56 participating States of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, meet, for the second time this year after our 
informal meeting in Corfu, to mark the significant progress that we have achieved 
together since the reunification of Europe and the elimination of Europe’s old 
divisions. We reconfirm that the vision of a free, democratic and more integrated 
OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines and zones with 
different levels of security remains a common goal, which we are determined to 
reach.
2. To achieve this goal, much work remains to be accomplished. We continue to be
seriously concerned that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and OSCE 
commitments are not fully respected and implemented; that the use of force has not 
ceased to be considered as an option in settling disputes; that the danger of conflicts 
between States has not been eliminated, and armed conflicts have occurred even in the 
last decades; that tensions still exist and many conflicts remain unresolved that 
stalemates in conventional arms control resolution of disagreements in this field, 
resumption of full implementation of the CFE Treaty regime, and restoration of its 
viability require urgent concerted action by its States Parties; and that our common 
achievements in the fields of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
need to be fully safeguarded and further advanced. This is occurring at a time when 
new emerging transnational threats require, more than ever, common responses.
3. We recognize that these security challenges, further accentuated by the ongoing
international financial and economic crisis, should be tackled with a renewed 
commitment to achieve results through multilateral dialogue and co-operation. At this 
stage, our highest priority remains to re-establish our trust and confidence, as well as 
to recapture the sense of common purpose that brought together our predecessors in 
Helsinki almost 35 years ago. In this context, we welcome the dialogue on the current 
and future challenges for security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, initiated at 
the 2008 Helsinki Ministerial Council and launched by the Greek Chairmanship in 
June 2009 as the “Corfu Process”, aimed at achieving the aforementioned goals. We 
consider the first ever OSCE Informal Ministerial Meeting in Corfu, with broad 
participation, as a milestone in this process, where we expressed our political will to 
confront security challenges, in all three OSCE dimensions.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe    
Ministerial Council
Athens 2009 Second day of the Seventeenth Meeting
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON THE
OSCE CORFU PROCESS:
Reconfirm-Review-Reinvigorate Security and Co-operation from
Vancouver to Vladivostok
; 
, 
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4. The Corfu Process has already improved the quality and contributed to the 
revitalization of our political dialogue in the OSCE on security and co-operation from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. We are committed to continue and further develop this 
process, setting ambitious, concrete and pragmatic goals, while also focusing on the 
key issues identified in our work so far. The OSCE, due to its broad membership and 
its multidimensional approach to common, comprehensive, co-operative and 
indivisible security, provides the appropriate forum for this dialogue. We welcome the 
valuable contributions of all relevant organizations and institutions dealing with 
security, on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security.
5. The dialogue within the Corfu Process will be grounded in the OSCE and in the
principles of equality, partnership, co-operation, inclusiveness and transparency. It 
will aim at addressing disagreements openly, honestly and in an unbiased manner, 
acknowledging our diversities and concerns, in a spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding. It will build on three basic guidelines:
(a) Adherence to the concept of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security, 
as enshrined in the OSCE fundamental documents;
(b) Compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE 
dimensions, in full and in good faith, and in a consistent manner by all;
(c) Determination to strengthen partnership and co-operation in the OSCE area, as 
well as to enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE and its contribution to security in 
our common space.
6. The Corfu Process will be taken forward by our Permanent Representatives to the
OSCE in Vienna, in accordance with the decision we are adopting today. We remain 
committed to provide strong political impetus to the Corfu Process, and we are 
looking forward to reassessing its progress in 2010, in the format and level that we 
will deem appropriate, taking into consideration the results we achieve.
7. We welcome Kazakhstan in the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, the first ever to be 
exercised by a Central Asian OSCE participating State. We note with interest its
proposal to hold an OSCE summit in 2010. We point out that such a high-level 
meeting would require adequate preparation in terms of substance and modalities. We 
task the Permanent Council to engage in exploratory consultations to determine the 
extent of progress on the OSCE agenda to inform our decision.
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A.2.
EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY
(Unofficial translation)
Draft
The Parties to this Treaty,
Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in conformity with 
international law,
Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (1975), as well as provisions of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes (1982) and Charter for European Security (1999),
Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the goals and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations  is inadmissible in their mutual relations, as well as international relations in 
general,
Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,
Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day security challenges 
and threats in the globalized and interdependent world,
Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly activated with a view to 
solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing concerns and adequately responding to 
challenges and threats in the security sphere,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of 
indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty 
individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international 
organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests 
of all other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these 
principles and to strengthen security of each other.
Article 2
1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting 
significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.
2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek 
to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations observe principles set forth in the Charter of 
the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final Act, 
Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, as well as in Article1 of this Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework 
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of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties 
to the Treaty.
3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any other 
Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to 
the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the 
Treaty.
Article 3
1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depositary, any 
other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational 
measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its 
security.
2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para.1 of this Article and of responses to 
them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the attention of the other Parties.
3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to ensure 
transparency and mutual trust in their relations.
Article 4
The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty, 
and to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its 
interpretation or application:
a) Consultations among the Parties;
b) Conference of the Parties;
c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.
Article 5
1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of violation of the 
Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with any other Party or Parties any issue 
relating to the substance of the Treaty and requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may 
request consultations on the issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested in 
such consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the Requesting Party to 
the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly all other Parties.
2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (...)days from the date of 
receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is indicated in the request.
3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to participate on its own 
initiative.
Article 6
1. Any participant to consultations held under Article5 of this Treaty shall be entitled, after having held 
the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene the Conference of the Parties to consider the 
issue that was the subject of the consultations.
2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the relevant proposal is 
supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within (...) days from the date of receipt of the 
relevant request.
3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two thirds of the Parties to 
the Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.
4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
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Article 7
1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the Treaty, immediate actions 
shall be undertaken in accordance with Article8(1) of the Treaty.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be entitled to consider 
an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-
defense under Article51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked 
Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Information on
measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the UN Security Council.
Article 8
1. In cases provided for by Article7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been attacked or threatened with 
an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the Depositary which shall immediately convene an 
Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to decide on necessary collective measures.
2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to the attention of the 
Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the Depositary to convene an Extraordinary 
Conference of the Parties, in which case the procedure provided for in Para.1 of this Article shall be 
applied.
3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, international 
organizations or other concerned parties to take part in it.
4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths 
of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be taken by 
unanimous vote and shall be binding. If an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack 
originates from a Party to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of 
votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.
The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
Article 9
1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the 
UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations 
of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the 
area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible with the 
Treaty.
3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.
4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality.
Article 10
This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in … from … to ….
Article 11
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to approval or adoption by the 
signatory international organizations. The relevant notifications shall be deposited with the government 
of ... which shall be the Depositary.
2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international organization shall 
outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by the Treaty.
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It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of competence.
3. States mentioned in Article10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during the period 
indicated in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the relevant notification with the 
Depositary.
Article 12
This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification with the 
Depositary in accordance with Article11 of the Treaty.
For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this Treaty or accedes to 
it after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification of ratification, adoption, approval or accession with 
the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State or 
organization of the relevant notification with the Depositary.
Article 13
Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into force, subject to 
the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.
For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the 
deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, provided that during the said period no 
Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its objections against such accession.
Article 14
Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that extraordinary 
circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme interests. The 
Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (...) 
days in advance of the planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary 
circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests.
November 29, 2009
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A.3.
1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 participating States of the OSCE,
have assembled in Astana, eleven years after the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul, to 
recommit ourselves to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-
Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, 
rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals. As we mark the 
35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, we reaffirm the relevance of, and our commitment to, the 
principles on which this Organization is based. While we have made much progress, 
we also acknowledge that more must be done to ensure full respect for, and 
implementation of, these core principles and commitments that we have undertaken in 
the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and the 
human dimension, notably in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to all 
OSCE norms, principles and commitments, starting from the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Charter of Paris, the Charter for European Security and all other OSCE documents to 
which we have agreed, and our responsibility to implement them fully and in good 
faith. We reiterate our commitment to the concept, initiated in the Final Act, of 
comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the 
maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.
3. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. 
Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right 
of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security 
arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the 
right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these 
regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other 
States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-
eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can 
consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. We will maintain only 
those military capabilities that are commensurate with our legitimate individual or 
collective security needs, taking into account obligations under international law, as 
well as the legitimate security concerns of other States. We further reaffirm that all 
OSCE principles and commitments, without exception, apply equally to each 
participating State, and we emphasize that we are accountable to our citizens and 
responsible to each other for their full implementation. We regard these commitments
as our common achievement, and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate 
and legitimate concern to all participating States.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Summit
Astana 2010
ASTANA COMMEMORATIVE DECLARATION
TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY
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4. These norms, principles and commitments have enabled us to make progress in 
putting old confrontations behind us and in moving us closer to democracy, peace and 
unity throughout the OSCE area. They must continue to guide us in the 21st century as 
we work together to make the ambitious vision of Helsinki and Paris a reality for all 
our peoples. These and all other OSCE documents establish clear standards for the 
participating States in their treatment of each other and of all individuals within their 
territories. Resolved to build further upon this strong foundation, we reaffirm our 
commitment to strengthen security, trust and good-neighbourly relations among our 
States and peoples. In this respect we are convinced that the role of the OSCE remains 
crucial, and should be further enhanced. We will further work towards strengthening 
the OSCE’s effectiveness and efficiency.
5. We recognize that the OSCE, as the most inclusive and comprehensive regional
security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, continues to provide a 
unique forum, operating on the basis of consensus and the sovereign equality of 
States, for promoting open dialogue, preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual 
understanding and fostering co-operation. We stress the importance of the work 
carried out by the OSCE Secretariat, High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Representative on Freedom 
of the Media, as well as the OSCE field operations, in accordance with their 
respective mandates, in assisting participating States with implementing their OSCE 
commitments. We are determined to intensify co-operation with the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, and encourage its efforts to promote security, democracy, 
and prosperity throughout the OSCE area and within participating States and to
increase confidence among participating States. We also acknowledge the 
Organization’s significant role in establishing effective confidence- and security-
building measures. We reaffirm our commitment to their full implementation and our 
determination to ensure that they continue to make a substantial contribution to our 
common and indivisible security.
6. The OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, which 
addresses the human, economic and environmental, political and military dimensions 
of security as an integral whole, remains indispensable. Convinced that the inherent 
dignity of the individual is at the core of comprehensive security, we reiterate that 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are inalienable, and that their protection and 
promotion is our first responsibility.
We reaffirm categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the 
field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all 
participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State 
concerned. We value the important role played by civil society and free media in 
helping us to ensure full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, 
including free and fair elections, and the rule of law.
7. Serious threats and challenges remain. Mistrust and divergent security perceptions
must be overcome. Our commitments in the politico-military, economic and 
environmental, and human dimensions need to be fully implemented. Respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law must be 
safeguarded and strengthened. Greater efforts must be made to promote freedom of 
religion or belief and to combat intolerance and discrimination. Mutually beneficial 
co-operation aimed at addressing the impact on our region’s security of economic and 
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environmental challenges must be further developed. Our energy security dialogue, 
including on agreed principles of our co-operation, must be enhanced. Increased 
efforts should be made to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a peaceful 
and negotiated manner, within agreed formats, fully respecting the norms and 
principles of international law enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well as the 
Helsinki Final Act. New crises must be prevented. We pledge to refrain from the 
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations or with the ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
8. Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes remain 
major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and 
should be revitalized, updated and modernized. We value the work of the Forum for 
Security Cooperation, and look forward to the updating of the Vienna Document 
1999. We value the CFE Treaty’s contribution to the creation of a stable and 
predictable environment for all OSCE participating States. We note that the CFE 
Treaty is not being implemented to its full capacity and the Agreement on Adaptation 
of the CFE Treaty (ACFE) has not entered into force. Recognizing intensified efforts 
to overcome the current impasse, we express our support for the ongoing 
consultations aiming at opening the way for negotiations in 2011.
9. At the same time, in today’s complex and inter-connected world, we must achieve
greater unity of purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats, such as 
terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, cyber threats and the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, 
drugs and human beings. Such threats can originate within or outside our region.
10. We recognize that the security of the OSCE area is inextricably linked to that of 
adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia. We must therefore enhance 
the level of our interaction with our Partners for Co-operation. In particular, we 
underscore the need to contribute effectively, based on the capacity and national 
interest of each participating State, to collective international efforts to promote a 
stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan.
11. We welcome initiatives aimed at strengthening European security. Our security 
dialogue, enhanced by the Corfu Process, has helped to sharpen our focus on these 
and other challenges we face in all three dimensions. The time has now come to act, 
and we must define concrete and tangible goals in addressing these challenges. We 
are determined to work together to fully realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-
operative and indivisible security community throughout our shared OSCE area. This 
security community should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century and 
based on our full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments 
across all three dimensions. It should unite all OSCE participating States across the 
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of 
influence and zones with different levels of security. We will work to ensure that co-
operation among our States, and among the relevant organizations and institutions of 
which they are members, will be guided by the principles of equality, partnership co-
operation, inclusiveness and transparency. Drawing strength from our diversity, we 
resolve to achieve this overarching goal through sustained determination and common 
effort, acting within the OSCE and in other formats.
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12. To this end, we task the incoming Chairmanship-in-Office with organizing a 
followup process within existing formats, taking into consideration ideas and 
proposals put forward by the participating States, including in the framework of the 
Corfu Process and in the preparation of the Astana Summit, and pledge to do all we 
can to assist the incoming Chairmanships- in-Office in developing a concrete action 
plan based on the work done by the Kazakhstan Chairmanship. Progress achieved will 
be reviewed at the next OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius on 6 to 7 
December 2011.
13. We express our deep gratitude to Kazakhstan for hosting our meeting, and for the 
energy and vitality the country has brought to the challenging task of chairing the 
OSCE in 2010. We welcome Lithuania’s Chairmanship of the Organization in 2011, 
Ireland’s in 2012 and Ukraine’s in 2013.
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Zusammenfassung
Die OSZE ist die einzige internationale Organisation, die auf einem 
wissenschaftlichen theoretischen Rahmen aufgebaut ist. Sie ist in drei Dimensionen 
gegliedert: die politisch-militärische, die Wirtschaft- und Umweltdimension und die 
humanitäre Dimension. Eine Schwierigkeit bezüglich der Effizienz der OSZE liegt in 
der Tatsache, dass ihre Entscheidungen nur Empfehlungen darstellen.
Als die Russische Föderation im Dezember 2008 eine Reform der europäisch-
atlantischen Sicherheitsarchitektur durch die Einführung eines rechtlich verbindlichen 
Vertrags, des Europäischen Sicherheitsvertrags (EST), vorschlug, löste das einen 
umfassenden Sicherheitsdialog innerhalb der OSZE, den sogenannten Korfu-Prozess, 
aus. Der Korfu-Prozess besteht aus zehn „ticks“, d.h. Aspekten, in denen 
Reformbedarf bestand. Diese werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit, gestützt auf den 
umfassenden analytischen Rahmen von Buzan, Waever und de Wilde (1998), im 
Detail analysiert und mit den politischen Intentionen und dem Anwendungsbereich 
des EST verglichen. Es wird erläutert, dass der Korfu-Prozess die Rolle der OSZE 
stärken sollte, wobei wichtige militärische und politische Aspekte aus dem EST 
aufgegriffen, im Einklang mit dem traditionellen umfassenden Sicherheitsansatz der 
OSZE jedoch auch wirtschaftliche, Umwelt- und humanitäre Aspekte hinzugefügt 
wurden.
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Abstract
The OSCE is the only international organisation based on an academic theoretical 
framework. It is structured in three dimensions: the political-military, the economic-
environmental and the humanitarian dimension. One difficulty regarding the 
efficiency of the OSCE lies in the fact that its decisions are only recommendations.
When in December 2008 the Russian Federation proposed a reform of the Euro-
Atlantic security architecture through the introduction of a legally binding treaty, the 
European Security Treaty (EST ), this triggered a comprehensive security dialogue in 
the OSCE, the “Corfu Process”. The Corfu Process consists of ten “ticks”, aspects that 
needed reforming. These are analyzed in detail in the present thesis against the 
comprehensive framework of analysis proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde
(1998) and compared to the political intentions and the scope of the EST. It is argued 
that the Corfu Process was designed to invigorate the role of the OSCE, picking up 
important military and political aspects from the EST but adding also economic, 
environmental and humanitarian aspects in line with the OSCE's traditional 
comprehensive security approach.
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